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I. INTRODUCTION
Nearly all tort claims for child sexual abuse against Catholic
organizations in litigation today involve abuse that occurred decades
ago. 80.5% of incidents of clergy sexual abuse reported to Catholic
dioceses before 2002 involved incidents that occurred before 1985.1
For abuse reported after 2002, only 2.5% of incidents occurred
between 2002 and 2019; and only 0.3% of incidents occurred between
2015 and 2019.2
Observers have estimated that between 80 to 90% of child sexual
abuse claims in the US appear to be time-barred under generally

 Professor of Law, Penn State University, Penn State Law.
The Nature and Scope of Sexual Abuse of Minors by Catholic Priests and Deacons in the
United States, 1950-2002, JOHN JAY COLL. OF CRIM. JUST. 28 (2004)
https://tile.loc.gov/storageservices/master/gdc/gdcebookspublic/20/19/66/72/66/2019667266/2019667266.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PF8V-JL87] [hereinafter 2004 John Jay Report]. The number of reported
incidents alleged to have occurred per year rose between the mid-1960’s through the late
1970’s, peaked in the 1980’s, and thereafter declined sharply. Id. In 2002, the Boston Globe
exposed clergy sexual abuse and coverup within the Archdiocese of Boston. See, e.g., Matt
Carroll, Sacha Pfeiffer & Michael Rezendes, Church Allowed Abuse by Priest for Years, BOS.
GLOBE (Jan. 6, 2002), https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/special-reports/2002/01/06/churchallowed-abuse-priest-for-years/cSHfGkTIrAT25qKGvBuDNM/story.html
[https://perma.cc/4T8K-4DAX].
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Frequently Requested Church Statistics, CTR. FOR APPLIED RSCH. IN THE APOSTOLATE
(CARA), https://cara.georgetown.edu/frequently-requested-church-statistics/
[https://perma.cc/S5KX-CMK8]. A special investigator retained by the Archdiocese of New
York to review its handling of child sexual abuse claims concluded that only two
substantiated complaints of sexual abuse of a child were asserted since 2002 and the
archdiocese appropriately investigated both complaints. See, e.g., Cindy Hsu, Archdiocese of
New York Concludes Year-Long Review Into Child Sexual Abuse Scandal, CBS N.Y.C (Sept.
30, 2019, 5:30 PM), https://newyork.cbslocal.com/2019/09/30/archdiocese-concludes-year-ofreview-into-church-abuse-crisis/ [https://perma.cc/KE4T-WZRD].
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applicable limitations periods.3 Advocates for claimants have
persuaded some courts to apply the delayed discovery doctrine to
provide limitations relief in child sex abuse cases. 4 And, they have
persuaded legislatures to amend generally applicable tort limitations
statutes to provide relief from the otherwise applicable time bar.5
In 2019, New York and eight other states enacted retroactive
legislation that revived certain otherwise time-barred child sexual
abuse tort claims filed within a designated time period, known as
claim revival window legislation.6 The New York Child Victims’ Act
(NYCVA) opened a window during which child sexual abuse
claimants could sue Catholic and other organizations free of a
limitations defense (a claims revival window).7 Between July 1, 2018
and June 30, 2019, the annual average number of tort claims against
Catholic dioceses nationwide was three times the annual average
over the previous five years.8 In 2019, 4,220 persons reported 4,434

See TIMOTHY D. LYTTON, HOLDING BISHOPS ACCOUNTABLE 60 (2008). For child sexual abuse
claims asserted in Australia, observers estimate that 96.77% of claims were time-barred under
canon law when under asserted. Kieran Tapsell, ‘Catastrophic Institutional failure’ Can Be
Fixed,
NAT’L
CATH.
REP.
(Jan.
9,
2018),
https://www.ncronline.org/news/accountability/catastrophic-institutional-failure-catalogedaustralian-abuse-commission-can-be [https://perma.cc/LA28-TPT6].
4 See discussion infra Section V.
5 See generally Marci A. Hamilton et al., Child Abuse Statutes of Limitation Reform from 2002
to 2019, CHILD USA (May 5, 2020), https://childusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/CHILDUSA-2019-Annual-SOL-Report-May-2020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/37Z2-X3QR]
(describing
history of statutory limitations reform for child sexual abuse claims by state).
6 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214-g (McKinney 2020); see Revival and Window Laws Since 2002, CHILD
USA 27 (Mar. 26, 2021), https://childusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/US-WindowsRevivalLaws-for-CSA.pdf [https://perma.cc/4Z8P-QA3N]. In 2019, claims revival legislation passed in:
New York, Washington, D.C., Montana, New Jersey, Arizona, Vermont, Rhode Island,
California, North Carolina. Revival and Window Laws Since 2002, supra.
7 See discussion of the NYCVA infra Section VI.
8 2019 Annual Report Findings and Recommendations, U.S. CONF. OF CATH. BISHOPS (June
2020),
http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/child-and-youth-protection/upload/2019Annual-Report-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/B4RZ-7JQE] [hereinafter 2019 USCCB Report]; see
also The Relative Success of Civil SOL Window and Revival Statutes State-by-State, CHILD
USA,
https://childusa.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/03/child_relativesuccess_june2017_final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HM76972J] [hereinafter The Relative Success] (reporting the number of lawsuits filed after revival
window legislation opened in six states and Guam before nine states enacted revival window
legislation in 2019); see generally, Associated Press, New Wave of Sexual-Abuse Lawsuits Could
Cost Catholic Church More Than $4 billion, MKT. WATCH (Dec. 2, 2019, 12:30 PM),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/new-wave-of-sexual-abuse-lawsuits-could-cost-catholicchurch-over-4-billion-2019-12-02 [https://perma.cc/W3JV-EYRM] (explaining that potentially
more than 5,000 new sexual abuse lawsuits cases may be initiated in response to extension or
suspension of statute of limitations); Associated Press, Clergy Sex Abuse Allegations Triple,
U.S. Catholic Bishops Report, L.A. TIMES (June 26, 2020, 12:21 AM),
https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2020-06-25/clergy-sex-abuse-allegations-triple3
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allegations of child sexual abuse against Catholic organizations, a
200% increase in reports from 2018.9 Jeff Anderson & Associates, a
law firm representing child sexual abuse plaintiffs nationwide,
reported that as of August 3, 2020, it had filed 1,002 child sexual
abuse cases against Catholic dioceses in New York.10 As of February
2021, four of the eight Catholic dioceses in New York have filed for
bankruptcy under chapter 11.11
This article considers the evolution of limitations relief for timebarred child sexual abuse tort claims in New York culminating with
the claims revival window enacted in 2019 as part of the NYCVA.12
The story of child sexual abuse litigation against Catholic dioceses in
New York and the legal and political history of the NYCVA exposes
the important but largely unexplored balance of competing policy
objectives that limitations laws strike. How child sexual abuse
claimants achieved retribution by revival via the NYCVA reveals the
fragility of limitations laws and the importance of coherent and
consistent policy for revival of other types of time-barred claims.
Part II explains organizations’ tort liability for child sexual abuse
and their limitations defenses under New York law. Part III
considers how limitations laws balance plaintiffs’ interest in
compensation for injury against public interest in the reliability of
litigated outcomes. Part IV explains the development of arguments
for limitations relief specific to child sexual abuse claims. Part V
explains how New York courts evaluated these arguments before the
NYCVA opened a claims revival window. Part VI explains the
legislative history and content of the NYCVA. Part VII offers a
us-roman-catholic-bishops-report [https://perma.cc/XV6U-3RG9] (detailing that in the 20182019 audit year there were 4,434 sex abuse allegations against the clergy).
9 2019 USCCB Report, supra note 8, at 27 (reporting on the period between July 1, 2018 and
June 30, 2019); 2018 Annual Report Findings and Recommendations, UNITED STATES C ONF. OF
CATH. BISHOPS 24 (June 2019), https://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/child-and-youthprotection/child-abuse-prevention/upload/2018-CYP-Annual-Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WW8V-DPPU] [hereinafter 2018 USCCB Report].
10 Mike Finnegan, New York Child Victims Act Extended One Year to August 13, 2021, JEFF
ANDERSON & ASSOC. (Aug. 3, 2020), https://www.andersonadvocates.com/new-york-childvictims-act-extended-one-year/ [https://perma.cc/C4TF-PYXJ]; see also The Relative Success,
supra note 8 (summarizing effect of claims revival legislation in states that enacted claims
revival legislation before January 2019).
11 Alex Wolf, New York Catholic Diocese Bankruptcies Put Abuse Claims in Limbo, BLOOMBERG
L. (Feb. 12, 2021, 6:01 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bankruptcy-law/new-york-catholicdiocese-bankruptcies-put-abuse-claims-in-limbo [https://perma.cc/RB8Z-DRWX]. The four
dioceses are Rochester, Buffalo, Syracuse, Rockville Centre. Id.
12 The term ‘limitations law’ refers to statutes imposing limitations periods and the judgemade law that interpret the statutes. See, e.g., Tyler T. Ochoa & Andrew J. Wistrich, The
Puzzling Purposes of Statutes of Limitations, 28 PAC. L. J. 453, 454 (1997).
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critique of claims revival window legislation for child sexual abuse
tort claims, and Part VIII concludes.
II. BASES FOR TORT LIABILITY AND THE LIMITATIONS DEFENSE
Under New York law, an employer of a perpetrator who abuses a
child is not vicariously liable for injuries caused by the abuser if the
abusive actions are outside the scope of employment.13 New York
courts have held that sexual abuse of a child committed by an
employee priest is outside the scope of the priest’s employment and
thus a diocesan employer is not vicariously liable.14 An employer can,
however, be directly liable for injuries caused by an employee acting
outside the scope of employment based on the employer’s own
negligence in hiring, retaining or supervising the employee. 15 To
See, e.g., LEE S. KRIENDLER ET AL., 14 N.Y. PRAC., NEW YORK LAW OF TORTS § 9:16 (2020).
Vicarious liability of an employer for torts committed by an employee allocates risk of harm to
third persons intrinsic to the enterprise that the employer ostensibly controls to the employer.
See, e.g., JEFFREY J. SHAMPO, 74 AM. JUR. 2D TORTS § 60 (2021).
14 See, e.g., Kenneth R. v. Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn, 654 N.Y.S.2d 791, 793 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1997) (“[t]he plaintiffs’ amended complaint alleges that . . . the appellant's codefendant,
Enrique Diaz Jimenez, an ordained Roman Catholic priest, sexually abused the infant
plaintiffs. Enrique Diaz Jimenez pleaded guilty to sexual abuse in the third degree based upon
this conduct. However, as noted by the Supreme Court, that conduct did not fall within the
scope of his employment and therefore the appellant is not vicariously liable for his conduct
under the theory of respondeat superior”) (citing Cornell v. State, 389 N.E.2d 1064 (N.Y. 1979));
Doe v. Rohan, 793 N.Y.S.2d 170, 173 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (“[s]ince the bus driver's acts of
sexual abuse and molestation were a clear departure from the scope of his employment,
committed solely for personal reasons, and unrelated to the furtherance of his employer's
business, neither the bus company nor the School District can be held vicariously liable for his
acts ”) (citing N.X. v. Cabrini Med. Ctr., 765 N.E.2d 844 (N.Y. 2002)); Mazzarella v. Syracuse
Diocese, 953 N.Y.S.2d 436, 437 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) (stating that sexual abuse is a clear
departure from scope of employment) (citing Wende C. v. United Methodist Church, 776 N.Y.2d
390 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004)); Doe v. Church of St. Christopher, No. 18551/03, 2006 N.Y. Misc.
LEXIS 3076, at *5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 10, 2006) (holding that a sexual assault on a minor by a
youth volunteer is outside the scope of duties as a volunteer). But see, Fearing v. Bucher, 977
P.2d 1163, 1168 (Or. 1999) (holding that a jury could find that the Archdiocese of Portland was
vicariously liable for a priest’s sexual abuse of a minor parishioner because whether the sexual
abuse was in the scope of the priest’s employment should turn not on the intentional nature of
the abuse but rather on whether the abuse was “a direct outgrowth of and were engendered by
conduct that was within the scope of . . . employment”) (citing Chesterman v. Barmon, 753 P.2d
404 (Or. 1988)).
15 See, e.g., Seiden v. Sonstein, 7 N.Y.S.3d 565, 568 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015) (noting that hospital
may be liable for negligent hiring or retention of an employee “to the extent that its employee
committed an independent act of negligence outside the scope of employment, where the
hospital was aware of, or reasonably should have foreseen, the employee’s propensity to commit
such an act”) (citing Doe v. Guthrie Clinic, Ltd., 5 N.E.3d 578 (N.Y. 2014)). If the employee was
acting within the scope of employment when the injury occurred, the plaintiff is limited to a
respondeat superior claim against the employer and may not pursue a claim for negligent
hiring, retention, or supervision, except when the plaintiff seeks punitive damages for the
13
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state a claim under New York law for negligent hiring or supervision,
the plaintiff must allege a causal connection between the injury and
the employment, and that the employer knew or should have known
before the injury occurred of the employee’s propensity for the
conduct which caused the injury.16
In a child sexual abuse case based on negligent supervision of a
priest asserted against the Diocese of Brooklyn in 1997, the court
held that the diocese had no common law duty to investigate a
potential employee before hiring him unless the employer knew facts
which would lead a reasonably prudent person to investigate the
potential employee’s history.17 With respect to the plaintiff’s
allegation that the diocese negligently supervised the alleged
perpetrator, the court declined to dismiss the plaintiff’s claim because
the plaintiff had alleged facts sufficient to support an inference that
the diocese should have known of the perpetrator’s propensity for
sexual abuse of children.18 The plaintiff alleged that the perpetrator
made statements about his sexual behavior to other priests which,
the court concluded, gave the diocese notice of the priest’s propensity
employer’s gross negligence in hiring, retention, or supervision of an employee. Quiroz v.
Zottola, 948 N.Y.S. 2d 77, 89 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) (citing Talavera v. Arbit, 795 N.Y.S.2d 708
(N.Y. App. Div. 2005)); Coville v. Ryder Truck Rental, 817 N.Y.S.2d 179, 180 (N.Y. App. Div.
2006) (quoting Rossetti v. Bd. of Educ., 716 N.Y.S.2d 460, 462 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000)). To
support punitive damages against an employer for injury caused by an employee, the plaintiff
must prove that the defendant’s conduct “evidences a high degree of moral culpability, is so
flagrant as to transcend simple carelessness, or constitutes willful or wanton negligence or
recklessness so as to evince a conscious disregard for the rights of others.” Evans v. Stranger,
762 N.Y.S.2d 678, 680 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (citing Rey v. Park View Nursing Home, Inc., 692
N.Y.S.2d 686 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999)).
16 See, Sheila C. v. Povich, 781 N.Y.S.2d 342, 350–51 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (“[a]n essential
element of a cause of action for negligent hiring and retention is that the employer knew, or
should have known, of the employee’s propensity for the sort of conduct which caused the
injury”) (citing Gomez v. City of New York, 758 N.Y.S.2d 298 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003)); Werner v.
Diocese of Rockville Ctr., No. 900012/2019, 2020 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2003, at *23 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
May 11, 2020) (quoting Bumpus v. New York City Transit Auth., 851 N.Y.S.2d 591 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2008)); Krystal G. v. Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn, 933 N.Y.S.2d 515, 523–24 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2011) (noting that while plaintiff must allege a causal connection between the
employment and her injury, she need not show that the priest committed the abusive acts on
the diocese’s premises or with the diocese’s property) (citing Mirand v. City of New York, 637
N.E.2d 263 (N.Y. 1994)); see generally, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 302B (AM. L. INST.
1965) (stating liability for negligent supervision exists “where the actor has brought into
contact or association with the other a person whom the actor knows or should know to be
peculiarly likely to commit intentional misconduct, under circumstances which afford a
peculiar opportunity or temptation for such misconduct.”).
17 See Kenneth R, 654 N.Y.S.2d at 795 (stating there is “no common-law duty to institute
specific procedures for hiring employees unless the employer knows of facts that would lead a
reasonably prudent person to investigate the prospective employee”) (citing Ford v. Gildin, 613
N.Y.S. 2d 139 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994)).
18 See id. at 796.
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for abusive conduct.19 In 2020, in considering child sexual abuse
claims brought against the Diocese of Rockville-Centre under the
NYCVA revival window, the New York Supreme Court held that an
allegation that a diocese knew about clergy sexual abuse generally,
absent allegations that a diocese had prior knowledge of the alleged
abuser’s propensity, was insufficient to support a claim for negligent
supervision of a particular priest.20
Catholic and other religious organizations have contended that
the First Amendment bars litigation against the organization based
on its negligent supervision of a clerical employee as a prohibited
entanglement in religious doctrine.21 For example, in 2002, in
Malicki v. Doe22, the Florida Supreme Court rejected the Archdiocese
of Miami’s First Amendment entanglement defense.23 The Florida
Supreme Court held that tort liability “has a secular purpose” and its
primary effect “neither advances nor inhibits religion.” 24 Five years
earlier, a panel of the New York Supreme Court rejected a similar
defense by a Catholic diocese in a priest sexual abuse case.25
Although legal commentators are divided on the issue, a majority of
courts that have considered a religious autonomy defense in this
context have rejected it.26
See id. at 795. But see Bouchard v. New York Archdiocese, 719 F. Supp. 255, 262 (S.D.N.Y.
2010) (granting archdiocese’s motion for summary judgment on negligent supervision claim
because plaintiff failed to allege that Archdiocese had prior knowledge of priest’s propensity for
sexual abuse); Krystal G., 933 N.Y.S.2d at 522 (dismissing the plaintiff’s negligent hiring claim
on account of missing allegations of facts supporting an inference that at the time of the hiring,
the diocese and school [the employer] should have known that the employee would present a
sexual threat to children).
20 See Doe v. Diocese of Rockville Ctr., No. 900010/2019, 2020 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1964, at *24
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 11, 2020) (holding that plaintiff sufficiently plead facts which, if proven,
would establish the requisite knowledge or notice of the allegedly abusive priest’s dangerous
propensity for child sexual abuse) (citing Shor v. Touch-N-Go Farms, Inc., 933 N.Y.S.2d 686
(N.Y. App. Div. 2011)).
21 See Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2069 (2020) (holding
the ministerial exception to nondiscrimination law applies to teachers at religiously affiliated
schools whose job includes some element of religious instruction).
22 Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 2002).
23 See id. at 350.
24 Id. at 364.
25 See Kenneth R. V. Roman Cath. Diocese, 654 N.Y.S.2d 791, 796 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997) (holding
that due care in retention or supervision of a priest employee would not implicate any religious
doctrine or inhibit religious practices) (citing Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of
Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 (1990)); see also, Doe v. Congregation of the Mission of St. Vincent
De Paul, No. 711854/15, 2016 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3940, at *17 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 13, 2016)
(holding that religious autonomy as defense to liability did not apply to negligent supervision
claim against a Catholic religious order).
26 See Angela C. Carmella, Catholic Institutions in Court: The Religion Clauses and PoliticalLegal Compromise, 120 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 49-50, nn.271-276 (2017) (citing cases decided post19
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III. THE PURPOSE OF LIMITATIONS LAW
The term ‘statute of limitations’ refers to any statute that bars
litigation of a claim after a set interval of time after a cause of action
accrues.27 A claim on which the plaintiff fails to sue within the
limitations period is subject to a complete defense on limitations
grounds (the time-bar).28 The time-bar creates an incentive for
persons diligently to investigate and promptly sue on a claim.29 And,
it designates claims not asserted within the limitations period as
inherently unworthy of the investment of judicial resources without
regard to validity on the merits.30 The United States Supreme Court
has noted that statutes of limitations are not “a technical defense”
but rather are “vital to the welfare of society and are favored in the

2002). But see, Doe v. Marianist Province of the United States, No. ED107767, 2019 Mo. App.
LEXIS 2032, at *13 (Mo. Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2019) (First Amendment protects religious
organization from tort liability for negligent hiring or supervision of a religious employee); Doe
v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of St. Louis, 347 S.W.3d 588, 595 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011); see, e.g.,
Marci A. Hamilton, The Waterloo for the So-Called Church Autonomy Theory: Widespread
Clergy Abuse and Institutional Cover-Up, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 225, 242 (2007) (arguing that a
religious organization should be fully subject to tort liability for negligent supervision of its
employees because judicial enforcement of reasonable of care does not implicate religious
doctrine); Jeffrey R. Anderson et al., The First Amendment: Churches Seeking Sanctuary for
the Sins of the Fathers, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 617, 618 (2004) (describing Catholic
organizations’ assertion of the first amendment as the basis of ecclesiastical immunity as “an
act of unparalleled audacity and brazen legal maneuvering.”). But see, Mark E. Chopko, Stating
Claims Against Religious Institutions, 44 B.C. L. REV. 1089, 1115 (2003) (noting that judicial
determination of the reasonableness of a diocese’s hiring or supervision of a priest required a
court to consider questions of internal religious beliefs, risks subtle alternation of a church’s
internal structure, and necessarily offends the First Amendment).
27 See
Statute
of
Limitations,
CORNELL
L.
SCH.
LEGAL
INFO.
INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/statute_of_limitations [https://perma.cc/D35J-9SSD]; see
generally, Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Judicial Redress for Historical Crimes: Procedure, 5 INT’L L.
F. DU DROIT INT’L 36, 39 (2003) (noting that all legal systems include a procedural mechanism
to deal with undue delay in prosecution, of criminal or civil claims known as statute of
limitations in common law systems). In contrast, a statute of repose makes filing a claim within
a particular time period a required substantive element of a claim and recognizes a substantive
defense rather than a purely procedural defense. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 899, cmt.
g (AM. L. INST. 1979).
28 See Statute of Limitations, JRANK, https://law.jrank.org/pages/10502/Statute-Limitations
[https://perma.cc/6A3M-HS7D].
29 See Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879) (stating that the effect of limitations laws
is to stimulate plaintiffs to activity and punish their negligence and slumber) (citing United
States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111 (1979); see, e.g., Toussle, 397 U.S. at 115 (noting that, in a
criminal case, a time-bar “may also have the salutary effect of encouraging law enforcement
officials [to] promptly . . . investigate suspected criminal activity”); Hovis v. United Screen
Printers (In re Elkay Indus.), 167 B.R. 404, 40809 (D. S.C. 1994) (“limitations periods
discourage plaintiffs from sitting on their rights.”).
30 See Wood, 101 U.S. at 139.
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law.”31 A New York court observed that statutes of limitations “are
the result of legislative evaluation of a variety of considerations, not
all of which are easily reconcilable.”32
In 1828, Justice Story observed that legislatures intend limitations
statutes to “suppress fraud, by preventing fraudulent and unjust
claims from starting up at great distances of time.” 33 Story’s
observation, and the often-repeated statement that limitations laws
bar claims “after memories have faded, witnesses have died or
disappeared, and evidence has been lost,” 34 reveals an enduring
judicial intuition that time degrades the reliability of evidence and
correspondingly, the reliability of litigated outcomes and the judicial
system.35 The US Supreme Court has noted that stale claims are
inherently suspect on the merits.36 Persons tend not to neglect suing
on valid claims and the lapse of years without a suit on the claim
“creates . . . a presumption against its original validity.”37
Limitations laws protect defendants from the burden of litigating
claims based on time-degraded evidence because any outcome based
on that evidence is inherently unreliable.38 Potential defendants
benefit from a stable and discernable endpoint to their potential
liability.
An endpoint to potential liability has a social value as well.39
Without statutes of limitations, tort liability would persist from the
United States v. Oregon Lumber Co., 260 U.S. 290, 299 (1922) (quoting Wood v. Carpenter,
101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879)).
32 Bassile v. Covenant House, 575 N.Y.S.2d 233, 235 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991); see generally Ochoa
& Andrew, supra note 12, at 454 (describing limitations laws as a public policy puzzle).
33 Sherwood v. Sutton, 21 F. Cas. 1303, 1307 (D. N.H. 1828).
34 See, e.g., Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945) (citing Order of R.R. Tel.
v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342 (1944)); Toussle v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 114
(declaring that a limitations period for a criminal prosecution “is designed to protect individuals
from having to defend themselves against charges when the basic facts may have become
obscured by the passage of time”).
35 See Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 615 (2003) (noting that statutes of limitation protect
the reliability of evidence); United States v. Eliopoulos, 45 F. Supp. 777, 781 (D. N.J. 1942)
(noting that, in a criminal case, “prosecutions should not be allowed to ferment endlessly in the
files of the government to explode only after witnesses and proofs necessary to the protection
of the accused have by sheer lapse of time passed beyond availability”).
36 Riddlesbarger v. Hartford Ins. Co., 74 U.S. 386, 390 (1869).
37 Id. (observing the purpose of statute of limitations laws generally and holding that parties
to an insurance contract may agree to a notice of claims period to govern their contract rights).
38 Id. (noting that as evidence degrades with the passage of time “it might be impossible to
establish the truth”). See generally, Developments in the Law Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV.
L. REV. 1177, 1185 (1950) (“[t]he primary consideration underlying such legislation is
undoubtedly one of fairness to the defendant.”).
39 See, e.g., Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945) (noting that statutes of
limitations reflect public policy about the privilege to litigate and do not create a right in the
defendant); Goad v. Celotex Corp., 831 F.2d 508, 511 (4th Cir. 1987) (“[s]tatutes of
31
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time the cause of action accrues until the plaintiff releases it by
agreement or dies, and after death by wrongful death or survivor
actions.40 The endpoint to liability that limitations laws provide
facilitates the stability and value of relationships and investments
made in reliance on it.41 An endpoint to liability in the form of a
limitations defense focuses investment in law enforcement and civil
litigation on recent or current wrongdoing. Focusing on recent or
current claims likely yields a higher social return than investment in
redress of historic wrongdoing.42
The incentive the time bar creates to sue promptly after an injury
occurs protects the reliability of the legal system from the evidencedegrading effect of the passage of time, “when, by loss of evidence
from death of some witnesses, and the imperfect recollection of
others, or the destruction of documents, it might be impossible to
establish the truth.”43 The limitations period sets the time after
which a judicial outcome on the merits of the claim is likely to be less
reliable than a random determination.44
To prove a claim for negligence against a defendant responsible for
a perpetrator of child sexual abuse, the plaintiff must show that that
the defendant was on notice of the perpetrator’s propensity for child
sexual abuse before the abuse occurred.45 He must also prove that
the perpetrator abused him causing his damages.46 Priest personnel
records maintained by Catholic dioceses have provided reliable
documentary evidence of what the diocese knew about accusations of

limitation . . . are primarily instruments of public policy and of court management . . . ”);
Anthony v. Koppers Co., 425 A.2d 428, 441 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980), rev’d on other grounds, 436
A.2d 181 (Pa. 1981) (noting that limitations laws serve a public purpose by providing repose
and protecting the judicial system from dissipation of resources on adjudication of stale claims
based on stale evidence).
40 See Anthony, 425 A.2d at 441.
41 See John P. Dawson, Estoppel and Statutes of Limitation, 34 MICH. L. REV. 1, 4 (1935)
(noting that actors take statutes of limitations into account in their conduct and relationships
and “to disturb or disentangle them after a considerable lapse of time is socially undesirable”)
See Hazard, supra note 27, at 39; Potts v. Celotex Corp., 796 S.W.2d 678, 684 (Tenn. 1990)
(noting that limitations laws promote stability in personal and business relationships).
42 Hazard, supra note 27, at 39 (noting that a legal system’s “higher priority” is “dealing with
more recent wrongs that disturb the community’s peace”).
43 United States v. Oregon Lumber Co., 260 U.S. 290, 300 (1922) (quoting Riddlesbarger v.
Hartford Ins. Co., 74 U.S. 386, 390 (1869)).
44 See Richard A. Epstein, The Temporal Dimension in Tort Law, 53 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 1175,
1181 (1986) (stating that the time interval between the events that generate tort liability and
the legal imposition of it by judgment affects the reliability of a litigated liability decision on
the merits relative to other means of accomplishing the social goals of tort laws).
45 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 16.
46 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 16.
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child sexual abuse against clergy and when it knew it.47 This type of
archival documentary evidence is remarkably impervious to the
passage of time. With respect to proof of the abuse, and the damages
caused by that abuse, however, relevant evidence is highly
vulnerable to degradation over time.48 The defendant’s ability to
challenge the plaintiff’s testimony on these issues, and its insurers’
ability to ascertain coverage, depend on the eyewitness accounts of
the abuse, evidence which notoriously degrades in availability and
reliability over time.49 Evidence relevant to the plaintiff’s damages
and the causal link between those damages and the alleged abuse is
similarly at risk of degradation over time.50
The degradation of evidence over time likely increases the social
costs of litigation. As the reliability of evidence declines over time,
the cost of evidence-based litigation increases, and the likelihood of
settlement decreases.51 A particular limitations period ideally
assigns the risk of an erroneous judicial outcome due to timedegraded evidence to the plaintiff (via the time-bar effect) at the point
in time where the risk to the reliability of the judicial system (from
an unreliable outcome) outweighs the value of giving plaintiff access
to the judicial system.
The private and social value of a limitations period is relatively
simple. The difficulty is in the details. To maximize the value of the
incentive to sue promptly after an injury occurs, the ideal length of a
limitations period applicable to a certain kind of cause of action
should be the average time it takes a plaintiff acting reasonably to
investigate and file a complaint. The time necessary to sue varies
depending on the circumstances, ostensibly reflecting the
legislatures’ perceptions of how the passage of time affects the
plaintiffs’ capacity to investigate and commence suit, and the
reliability of litigation, on various types of claims.
Of course, when a limitations period ends depends on when it
begins to run. A limitations period typically beings to run when the
plaintiff’s cause of action accrues.52 The adoption of this starting
See, e.g., Introduction to the Archives, BISHOPACCOUNTABILITY.ORG, http://www.bishopaccountability.org/ma-boston/archives/PatternAndPractice/sample-documents.htm
[https://perma.cc/L6ZF-8J85] (archiving of diocesan and other documents online that were
made public in connection with sexual abuse complaints).
48 See discussion, supra Part III.
49 See discussion, supra Part III.
50 See discussion, supra Part III.
51 Id. at 1182.
52 See United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979); Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325
U.S. 304, 314 (1945); Bay Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension Tr. Fund v. Ferbar Corp., 73
47
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point for the limitations clock reflects an implicit assumption that
the plaintiff is aware of the injury when it occurs and from that
moment is able to control whether and when to assert a claim.53 In
tort actions for damages due to intentionally or negligently caused
injury, a cause of action for injury of which the plaintiff is
immediately aware (traumatic injury) accrues when the injury
occurs.54 For injuries that occur without the plaintiff’s awareness
(latent injuries), the premise that the plaintiff can from the
occurrence control the cause of action is invalid, and a question arises
as to when the limitations period should begin to run.
Courts have recognized and applied what has come to be known as
the delayed discovery doctrine to toll the limitations period for
injuries that the plaintiff cannot discover until later. 55 The premise
for delaying the commencement of the limitations period in these
circumstances is that the plaintiff should not be subject to the timebar until she has or should have the capacity to control whether and
when to assert a claim for compensation for injury.56 Put another
way, tolling the limitations period until the plaintiff has reason to
know of her injury and its cause eliminates the inefficient incentive
to undertake continuous investigation of all possible claims to avoid
the time-bar effect that would otherwise arise.
The delayed discovery doctrine first appeared in tort actions where,
the plaintiff could not reasonably have discovered that she had been
injured until sometime after the injury occurred because of the
defendant’s fraud.57
Courts reasoned that until the plaintiff
F.3d 971, 973 (9th Cir. 1996); Goad v. Celotex Corp., 831 F.2d 508, 511 (4th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 487 U.S. 1218 (1988); Gates Rubber Co. v. USM Corp., 508 F.2d 603, 610 (7th Cir.
1975); see also Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 380 (1982).
53 Murphy v. Merzbacher, 697 A.2d 861, 864 (Md. 1997) (citing Harig v. Johns-Manville
Products, 394 A.2d 299, 303 (1978)) (“Ordinarily, our statute of limitations begins to ‘accrue’ on
the date of the wrong. The assumption, of course, is that ‘a potential tort plaintiff is
immediately aware that he [or she] has been wronged [and] is therefore put on notice that the
statute of limitations” is running.’”) (alteration in original).
54 E.g., Dana v. Oak Park Marina, 660 N.Y.S.2d 906, 910 (App. Div. 1997) (stating that the
limitations period begins to run in a tort action upon injury).
55 See, e.g., 1 CACI 455 (2020) (stating, in form jury instruction, when the plaintiff reasonably
should have discovered that she was harmed by another person’s wrongful conduct).
56 E.g., Gabelli v. SEC, 568 U.S. 442, 450–51 (2013) (“Most of us do not live in a state of constant
investigation; absent any reason to think we have been injured, we do not typically spend our
days looking for evidence that we were lied to or defrauded.”).
57 E.g., Sherwood v. Sutton, 21 F. Cas. 1303, 1307 (D. N.H. 1828) (delaying the commencement
of the limitations period in a tort action for fraud until the plaintiff reasonably could have
discovered the fraud); Veazie v. Williams, 49 U.S. 134, 158–59 (1850) (recognizing an equitable
exception to the commencement of a limitations period for a tort action for a fraudulent bidding
scheme until the plaintiff reasonably could have discovered the fraud); Rosenthal v. Walker,
111 U.S. 185, 186–88 (1884) (recognizing equitable exception to a limitations defense to a
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reasonably could discover the defendant’s fraud, the running of the
limitations clock would reward a defendant who managed to conceal
the injury he inflicted by fraud until after the limitations period
expired.58
By the beginning of the twentieth century, courts expanded the
delayed discovery doctrine beyond tort actions for fraud.59 For
example, in Urie v. Thompson,60 the Supreme Court applied the
delayed discovery doctrine as federal common law to delay the
running of the limitations period under the Federal Employer’s
Liability Act until the plaintiff reasonably should have discovered
that thirty years of inhaling silica dust in his workplace caused his
silicosis.61 Courts began to use the term “latent injury” (contrast
“traumatic injury”) to describe a “self-concealing” injury, to which the
delayed discovery doctrine applies.”62 Delaying the start of the
limitations period until the plaintiff should have discovered the
injury in latent injury cases similarly withheld the benefit of the

fraudulent transfer action until the bankruptcy trustee discovered the fraudulent transfer
because the transferee hid the transfer from the trustee). See generally, JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE: AS ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 740
(9th ed. 1866) (“In cases of fraud or mistake, [the limitations period] will begin to run from the
time of the discovery of such fraud or mistake, and not before.”); William Trickett, THE LAW OF
LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS IN PENNSYLVANIA 248 (1888) (“In cases in which fraud is the fact out
of which a cause of action arises, the commencement of the statutory term will be postponed
until the discovery of this fact.”).
58 Sherwood, 21 F. Cas. at 1305. See also Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. 342, 349 (1874):
To hold that by concealing a fraud, or by committing a fraud in a manner that it concealed
itself until such time as the party committing the fraud could plead the statute of
limitations to protect it, is to make the law which was designed to prevent fraud the means
by which it is made successful and secure.
See CALVIN CORMAN, LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS §§ 11.1.2.1, 11.1.2.3, 136–42, and nn.6–13,
18–23 (1991) (collecting cases). See generally, Michael D. Green, The Paradox of Statutes of
Limitations in Toxic Substances Litigation, 76 CAL. L. REV. 965, 972–74 (1988) (noting a latency
period between the exposure and the injury, and uncertainty about the causal relationship
between the harm and the injury).
60 337 U.S. 163 (1949); see also, United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 113, 123–24 (1979)
(applying federal common law to a latent injury); Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363,
1366 (9th Cir. 1986) (same).
61 Urie, 337 U.S. at 168–71 (1949); see also, Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633, 645 (2010)
(“[S]tate and federal courts have applied forms of the ‘discovery rule’ to claims other than
fraud.”).
62 See, e.g., Albertson v. TlJ. Stevenson & Co., 749 F.2d 223, 229 (1984) (using the phrase
“latent injury” to refer to an injury “which either is not or cannot be discovered until long after
the tortious act that caused the injury has occurred”); St. John v. Arkansas Lime Co., 8 Ark.
App. 278, 279 (1983) (noting that under the “latent injury theory” the limitations period begins
to run when the plaintiff discovers the “substantial character” of the injury).
59
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time-bar from a defendant whose tortious conduct, although not
fraudulent, happened by its nature to be self-concealing.63
In cases of latent injury, as for cases of fraud, courts hold that the
limitations period begins to run at the earlier of: 1) the plaintiff’s
actual discovery of the injury; or 2) the time when the plaintiff with
reasonable diligence should have discovered the injury.64 A cause of
action accrues when, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, a
plaintiff should have discovered both the injury and its cause,
without regard to when the plaintiff subjectively knows of all facts
regarding the injury and its causes.65
IV. LIMITATIONS DEFENSES IN CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASES
The development of legal arguments to justify delayed discovery of
a child sexual abuse claim as an exception to the time-bar effect of a
statute of limitations mirrored developments in psychological
theories regarding memory and cognition of childhood sexual trauma.
Although their scientific bases are controversial, psychological
theories have been remarkably successful in distinguishing injury
from child sexual abuse from injury from other forms of traumatic
abuse and as bases for arguments in favor of limitations relief for
child sexual abuse claimants.
A. Repressed Memory Theory
During the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, the number of adults
asserting tort claims against their parents for incestuous sexual
abuse they experienced as children rose significantly.66 The surge
may be attributable in part to public fascination with child sexual
E.g., Gabelli v. SEC, 568 U.S. 442, 450 (2013) (noting that “when the injury is self-concealing,
private parties may be unaware that they have been harmed.”).
64 See id.; Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 397 (1946); see, e.g., Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S.
549, 560–61 (2000).
65 See 37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud and Deceit § 347 (2021 Update) (noting that in applying the
discovery rule, courts charge a plaintiff with discovery of an injury once a reasonably diligent
party would be in a position that they should have sufficient knowledge or information to
discovery the defendant’s fraud).
66 See Mark MacNamara, The Rise and Fall of the Repressed Memory Theory in the Courtroom,
15 CAL. LAW. 36, 38 (1995) (estimating 800 repressed memory childhood incestuous abuse cases
between the mid-1980s and 1995); James A. McClear, New Therapy Leads Families to Court,
DET. NEWS, May 12, 1993, at A1 (describing rise in lawsuits for childhood sexual abuse); Gary
Hood, The Statute of Limitations Barrier in Civil Suits Brought by Adult Survivors of Child
Sexual Abuse: A Simple Solution, 1994 UNIV. ILL. L. REV. 417, 417 (1994) (noting that
incestuous child sexual abuse has “become an issue of great public concern in recent years” and
that the “incidence of known child sexual abuse has reached staggering proportions”).
63
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abuse stimulated by national media attention to the McMartin preschool criminal sexual abuse trial that began in 1984. 67 In 1988, in
Johnson v. Johnson,68 a federal district court in Illinois noted that
childhood incest was “a major social problem.”69
During this period, father/daughter incestuous sexual abuse was a
topic of intense interest among feminist theorists and
psychotherapists as a cause of adult women’s depression and other
emotional and psychological disorders.70 In The Courage to Heal,71 a
See generally, Clyde Haberman, The Trial that Unleashed Hysteria Over Child Abuse, N. Y.
TIMES, (March 9, 2014) https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/10/us/the-trial-that-unleashedhysteria-over-child-abuse.html [https://perma.cc/BE24-GG4S] (describing New York Times
coverage of the McMartin Preschool abuse trial and noting that media coverage “unleashed
nationwide hysteria about child abuse and Satanism in schools”); Robert Reinhold, The Longest
Trial- A Post-Mortem; Collapse of a Child Abuse Case: So Much Agony for So Little, N. Y. TIMES,
Jan. 24, 1990, at A1 (describing the trial); Debbie Nation, The Ritual Sex Abuse Hoax, THE
VILLAGE VOICE, January 12, 1990, at 36–44, reprinted in Debbie Nathan, Women and Other
Aliens: Essays from the U.S. Mexico Border (Cinco Puntos Press 1991) (describing the criminal
trials against individuals associated with a California pre-school charged with child sexual
abuse).
68 701 F. Supp. 1363 (E.D. Ill. 1988).
69 Id. at 1370. The court cited a law student note for the proposition that “[m]uch of the sexual
abuse of children occurs within the family.” Id. (citing Melissa G. Salten, Statutes of
Limitations in Civil Incest Suits: Preserving the Victim’s Remedy, 7 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 189
(1984)). See E. SUE BLUME, SECRET SURVIVORS: UNCOVERING INCEST AND ITS AFTEREFFECTS
IN WOMEN xxi (1st trade paperback ed. 1997) (claiming that “incest is so common as to be
epidemic. . . . At any given time more than three quarters of my clients are women who were
molested in childhood by someone they knew.”) (alteration in original); BEVERLY ENGLE, THE
RIGHT TO INNOCENCE: HEALING THE TRAUMA OF CHILDHOOD SEXUAL ABUSE 21 (1st ed. 1989)
(citing three studies purporting to estimate frequency of childhood incestuous sexual abuse).
Measuring frequency of childhood sexual abuse is notoriously difficult because: 1) what acts or
experiences constitute “sexual abuse” are not consistently defined and counted; 2) officially
reported incidents of abuse may not account for all abuse; and 3) reporting periods are not
consistent across studies. See also Emily M. Douglas & David Finkelhor, Childhood Sexual
Abuse Fact Sheet, UNIV. OF N.H. CRIMES AGAINST CHILD. RSCH. CTR.,
http://www.unh.edu/ccrc/factsheet/pdf/CSA-FS20.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GQ2J-2MW7]
(discussing statistics of frequency of childhood sexual abuse); DAVID M. FERGUSON & PAUL E.
MULLEN, CHILDHOOD SEXUAL ABUSE: AN EVIDENCE BASED PERSPECTIVE 35–36 (Sage
Publications 1999); ELIZABETH LOFTUS & KATHERINE KETCHAM, THE MYTH OF REPRESSED
MEMORY 142 (St. Martin’s Press 1994) (noting that the premise that incest is critical social
problem is “[t]he first and most forcefully stated principle of the incest-survivor movement”).
70 See, e.g., DIANA E. H. RUSSELL, THE SECRET TRAUMA: INCEST IN THE LIVES OF GIRLS AND
WOMEN (Basic Books, 1986 and 2d ed. 1999) (arguing that childhood incest was a widespread
national crisis based on a survey of 930 adult women, 16% of which reported having been
sexually abused by a relative before age 18); Richard P. Kluft, Ramifications of Incest, 27
PSYCHIATRIC TIMES 2011 (2011), https://www.psychiatrictimes.com/view/ramifications-incest
[https://perma.cc/Z2Y3-LQZF] (noting the contribution of feminist authors and
traumatologists in raising awareness within the psychiatric profession regarding the
prevalence of father-daughter incest).
71 ELLEN BASS & LAURA DAVIS, THE COURAGE TO HEAL: A GUIDE FOR WOMEN SURVIVORS OF
CHILDHOOD SEXUAL ABUSE (1st ed. 1988). Bass and Davis published three subsequent editions
of THE COURAGE TO HEAL, most recently a 20th anniversary edition in 2008; see also, Elizabeth
Loftus, The Reality of Repressed Memories, 48 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 518, 537 (1993) (noting that
67
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best-selling book in 1988, the authors, a college creative writing
instructor and her student, neither of whom had scientific or
psychiatric training,72 asserted that women who presented symptoms
of psychological or emotional dysfunction as adults were likely
victims of incestuous abuse as children.73 The authors posited that
women with these symptoms who did not remember any incidents of
incestuous abuse likely had unconsciously repressed their memories
as a protective response to the trauma of the abuse.74 The authors
encouraged women who experienced symptoms of depression or
emotional disorders to uncover their repressed memories of childhood
incest through therapy and thereby overcome them.75
One aspect of the recommended therapy was a civil tort action
against a parent incest-perpetrator.76 A best-selling book in 1990
about incestuous child abuse, Secret Survivors, included a section
titled “Suing Perpetrators,” in which the author noted the
psychological benefit to an incest survivor of suing the perpetrator,
and that settlements can pay for “large medical and psychotherapy
expenses.”77
Access to coverage under parents’ homeowners’
insurance policies may have also been a factor in the increase in tort
claims for childhood incestuous abuse against parents. 78
“all roads on the search for popular writings inevitably lead to [the book].”). The book was
described as “the bible of the []survivor[’]s[] movement.” B. Tully, Recovered Memories of
Childhood Sexual Abuse: A Concise Social History of the Phenomenon, and the Key
Psychological Concepts Relevant to Understanding the Disputes Concerning Such Claims, J.
CLINICAL FORENSIC MED. 73, 74 (1996).
72 BASS & DAVIS, supra note 71, at 14.
73 Id. at 20.
74 Id. at 22.
75 Id.; see also, ELIZABETH LOFTUS & KATHERINE KETCHAM, THE MYTH OF REPRESSED MEMORY
21-22 (1994) (describing psychotherapeutic techniques to stimulate “memories” of childhood
sexual abuse among women patients); PAUL. R. MCHUGH, TRY TO REMEMBER: PSYCHIATRY’S
CLASH OVER MEANING, MEMORY, AND MIND 252 (2008) (noting that repressed memory theory
advanced in THE COURAGE TO HEAL was used primarily by “incompetent therapists”).
76 See BASS & DAVIS, supra note 71, at 307, 308.
77 See E. SUE BLUME, SECRET SURVIVORS: UNCOVERING INCEST AND ITS A FTEREFFECTS IN
WOMEN 284 (1st ed. 1990); see also, LOFTUS & KETCHAM, supra note 75, at 173-74 (describing
how authors of popular incest survivor self-help books encouraged lawsuits against
perpetrators).
78 See, e.g., S.V. v. R.V., 933 S.W.2d 1, 13 (Tex. 1996) (noting that adult daughter’s allegation
against father for incestuous abuse based on negligence rather than intentional tort
presumably was to access the parents’ homeowner’s policy coverage) (citing Boyles v. Kerr, 855
S.W.2d 593, 601 (Tex. 1993)); Boyles, 855 S.W.2d at 601, 604 (Tex. 1993) (Gonzalez, J.
concurring) (reasoning that plaintiff’s counsel’s strategy in pursuing a claim based on negligent
infliction of emotional distress was to preserve access to defendants’ homeowner’s insurance);
see also, Ralph Slovenko, The “Revival Of Memory” of Childhood Sexual Abuse: Is the Tolling
of the Statute of Limitations Justified?, 21 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 7, 8, 20 (1993) (noting that “with
the demise of parental immunity,” childhood incest suits “mushroomed” usually with
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The use of psychological memory repression theory as basis for
application of the delayed discovery doctrine in child incest legal
cases sparked controversy.79 There is no practical way to distinguish
between unconsciously repressed memories of actual abuse revived
through therapy and false “memories” of abuse suggested by a
therapist.80 The plaintiff’s testimony regarding her recent recovery
in therapy of previously repressed memory of abuse was typically
uncorroborated except by her treating therapist.81 Theories about
how persons remember—or do not remember—experiences of
childhood sexual abuse has been described as the “memory wars”82
and “one of the most bitter controversies in psychiatry and
psychology . . . .”83
Memory repression theory provided an
settlement from insurance coverage, and notwithstanding denial of liability by the
policyholders, their insurance carrier controls settlement); Mary Hull, Family Secrets, 7 TEX.
LAW. 2, 2–3 (1991) (noting that after a Texas court held that homeowners’ insurance covered a
claim for incestuous sexual abuse, child versus parent incest claims increased).
79 See Gary M. Ernsdorff & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Let Sleeping Memories Lie? Words of Caution
About Tolling the Statute of Limitations in Case of Memory Repression, 84 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 129, 132 (1993) (concluding that repressed memory theory raised questions of
the reliability and authenticity of evidence particularly in childhood sexual abuse cases in
which the plaintiff’s testimony regarding recovered memories of the abuse was
uncorroborated).
80 See S.V. v. R.V., 933 S.W.2d at 17 (citing American Psychiatric Ass’n, Statement on Memories
of Sexual Abuse (1993), reprinted in 42 INT’L J. CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 261, 261
(1994)) (“It is not known how to distinguish, with complete accuracy, memories based on true
events from those derived from other sources.”); American Medical Ass’n, Council on Scientific
Affairs, Report on Memories of Childhood Abuse 3, 43–45 (1994), reprinted in 43 INT’L J.
CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 114, 116 (“there is no consensus about the extent or
sources of [memory malleability]”).
81 See, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 701 F. Supp. 1363, 1370 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (noting that the proof
offered to show plaintiff’s delayed discovery was the plaintiff’s and her therapist’s affidavit
testimony of plaintiff’s memory repression). In Johnson v. Johnson, the Illinois federal district
court predicted that the Illinois Supreme Court would recognize the delayed discovery rule in
a childhood incest repressed memory case and that when the plaintiff should have discovered
her injury and its cause was a question of fact for the jury. Id. at 1370.
82 E.g., FREDERICK CREWS ET AL., THE MEMORY WARS: FREUD’S LEGACY IN DISPUTE 33–34
(1995); Lawrence Patihis et al., Are the “Memory Wars” Over? A Scientist-Practitioner Gap in
Beliefs about Repressed Memory, 25 PSYCHOL. SCI. 519, 528, 528 tbl.5 (2014) (study concluding
that clinicians had a greater tendency to believe that people repress memories than researchers
did, that greater critical thinking ability was associated with heightened skepticism about
repressed memories, and that clinicians in 2014 were more skeptical about repressed memory
theory than clinicians in the 1990s).
83 Richard J. McNally, Dispelling Confusion About Traumatic Dissociative Amnesia, 82 MAYO
CLINIC PROC. 1083, 1083 (2007) (arguing that the evidence that repressed memory theorists
give in support of their theory—to that a sizeable minority of survivors of childhood sexual
abuse are unable to remember their trauma—is subject to other, more plausible
interpretations.); see Roland Summit, Recognition and Treatment of Child Sexual Abuse, 116
(1983); Judith L. Herman & Emily Schatzow, Recovery and Verification of Memories of
Childhood Sexual Trauma, 4 PSYCHOANALYTICAL PSYCHOL. 1, 7–8 (1987) (stating that people
who experience sexual abuse as children tend to remember both the abuse and the identity of
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explanation for adult psychological problems such as depression,
suicidal behavior, eating disorders, sleep disturbances, drug or
alcohol abuse, sexual dysfunction, tendencies towards promiscuity,
and a vulnerability towards revictimization.84 As one court noted,
however, although these maladies may be prevalent among people
who experienced prior traumas,85 the presence of such maladies does
not establish the occurrence of the trauma it presupposes, what kind
of trauma occurred, or who caused it.86 Nonetheless, some courts
were persuaded to delay commencement of the limitations period via
the delayed discovery doctrine on grounds of repressed memory
theory in child sexual abuse cases.87
B. Trauma and Delayed Connection of Injury and Consequences
In 1983, Roland Summit, a psychiatrist studying the effects of child
sexual abuse, asserted that the nature of child sexual abuse combined
with psychological responses to it (shame, embarrassment, sense of
responsibility and allegiance to the perpetrator) may explain why
abused children adapt to accept the abuse, fail to remember the abuse
they experience, and either fail to or delay in reporting the abuse.88
Summit asserted that this adaptive reaction, which he coined the
“sexual abuse accommodation syndrome,” may explain why children
react to sexual abuse differently than adults do.89 Lawyers for child
sexual abuse claimants offered expert psychological testimony on the
syndrome with mixed results to argue that a plaintiff’s testimony
about memory of child sexual abuse is uniquely reliable (if the child
the perpetrator); Jill Blake–White & Christine Madeline Kline, Treating the Dissociative
Process in Adult Victims of Childhood Incest, J. CONTEMP. SOC. WORK 394, 397 (1985).
84 See Carolyn B. Handler, Civil Claims of Adults Molested as Children: Maturation of Harm
and the Statute of Limitations Hurdle, 15 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 709, 716–17 (1986).
85 See, e.g., id.; Child Sexual Abuse Statistics: Consequences, DARKNESS TO LIGHT, 1–4 (2015),
https://www.d2l.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Statistics_5_Consequences.pdf
[https://perma.cc/59C8-FWGE] (citing to studies).
86 See, e.g., S.V. v. R.V., 933 S.W.2d 1, 19 (Tex. 1996).
87 E.g., Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan, Corp., 10 F. Supp. 2d 138, 143 157,
160 (D. Conn. 1998) (noting that the plaintiff’s repressed memories of childhood sexual abuse
were recovered during a conversation decades later with a childhood friend); Hearndon v.
Graham, 767 So.2d 1179, 1181 (Fla. 2000) (applying delayed discovery rule to postpone accrual
of cause of action due to plaintiff’s “traumatic amnesia” caused by childhood sexual abuse);
Vesecky v. Vesecky, 880 S.W.2d 804, 807 (Tex. App. 1994) (applying discovery rule to delay
accrual on evidence that plaintiff had no knowledge of her father’s sexual abuse when it
occurred during her childhood and could not reasonably have discovered the abuse until less
than two years before she filed).
88 See Roland C. Summit, The Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, 7 CHILD ABUSE
& NEGLECT 177, 181 (1983).
89 Id. at 181.
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claims to have been abused) or unreliable (if the child denies having
been abused), and as a basis for limitations relief to justify the
plaintiff’s delay in suing for compensation.90
Adults alleging tort claims for childhood sexual abuse relied on
research on the psychological and emotional repercussions of child
sexual abuse to support an alternative to repressed memory theory,
or sexual abuse accommodation syndrome as a basis for limitations
relief.91 The alternative theory asserted that although plaintiffs were
aware of the abuse when it occurred and thereafter, plaintiffs could
not perceive the connection between the abusive incidents and their
emotional and psychological injury until later, through therapy or via
some other triggering event.92 Application of the discovery doctrine
was warranted, proponents argued, because although they knew they
were injured at the time the abuse occurred, the unique nature of
child sexual abuse caused unique psychological trauma, the harmful
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Dunkle, 602 A.2d 830, 834–35 (Pa. 1992) (in a criminal case,
admission of expert testimony on the syndrome was reversible error because the theory was
not scientifically valid or generally accepted among child psychiatrists), superseded by statute,
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5920(a)(1)–(2), (b)(1)–(2) (2012). But see Wheat v. State, 527 A.2d 269,
270, 272, 275–76 (Del. 1987) (holding that admission of expert testimony on the syndrome was
not reversible error because it offered an explanation other than deceit for behavior perceived
as inconsistent with a valid claim for child sexual abuse). See generally Michele Meyer
McCarthy, Admissibility of Expert Testimony on Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome
in Kentucky, 81 KY. L. J. 727, 729 (1992); Arthur H. Garrison, Child Sexual Abuse
Accommodation Syndrome: Issues of Admissibility in Criminal Trials, 10 INST. PSYCHOL.
THERAPIES (1998); Kenneth J. Weiss & Julia Curcio Alexander, Sex, Lies, and Statistics:
Inferences from the Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, 41 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY
& L. 412, 415 (2013).
91 See, e.g., Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 533 N.W.2d 780, 782, 785 (Wis. 1995).
Studies showed that adults who experienced childhood sexual abuse exhibited delayed-onset
psychological symptoms like those associated with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). See,
e.g., Francine Albach & Walter Everaerd, Posttraumatic Stress Symptoms in Victims of
Childhood Incest, 57 PSYCHOTHERAPY & PSYCHOSOMATICS 143, 148 (1992) (showing 62% of
adult female incest victims met criteria for PTSD); Susan McLeer et al., Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder in Sexually Abused Children, 27 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 650,
653 (1988) (collecting studies reporting 46–66% of sexually abused children demonstrate
significant and severe symptoms, and 40–80% of symptoms constitute partial criteria for DSMIII-R (PTSD)); DAVID FINKELHOR, A SOURCEBOOK ON CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 162–63 (1986).
92 See, e.g., Pritzlaff, 533 N.W.2d at 785, 786; Marci A. Hamilton, The Time Has Come for a
Restatement of Child Sex Abuse, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 397, 399–400 (2014) (“Social science studies
have shown that children in fact do not fully understand (if they understand at all) what sex
is, and certainly have no idea of the lifelong consequences of being sexually assaulted.”). For
more statistics on child sexual abuse, see studies cited in Child Sexual Abuse Statistics,
DARKNESS
TO
LIGHT,
http://www.d2l.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/01/all_statistics_20150619.pdf [https://perma.cc/JY5Y-5DZ2]; Child
Sexual Abuse Statistics: Reporting Abuse, DARKNESS TO LIGHT, http://www.d2l.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/01/Statistics_6_Reporting.pdf [https://perma.cc/VS9T-C7CS]; Statistics Child Sexual Abuse, CRIME VICTIMS CTR., https://www.parentsformeganslaw.org/statisticschild-sexual-abuse/ [https://perma.cc/MQ72-Y2EP].
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consequences of which could remain hidden from the plaintiff long
after the abusive incidents occurred.93 The limitations period should
therefore be tolled until a “triggering event” sparked in the plaintiff
an understanding of the connection between the injury the plaintiff
experienced as a child and the plaintiff’s current psychological and
emotional problems.94
The delayed connection theory posited that the limitations period
should commence only when the plaintiff reasonably could have
understood fully the psychological, emotional, and legal ramifications
of childhood sexual abuse. Under this theory, therapists and other
psychological experts testified as to the events that did or should have
triggered the plaintiff’s awareness of the connection between the
abusive incidents and their psychological and emotional maladies as
adults. For example, in Placette v. M.G.S.L.,95 the plaintiff conceded
that she knew she had been sexually abused as a child at the time
the abuse occurred.96 The plaintiff’s psychologist testified that the
plaintiff could not understand the reason for her ongoing
psychological difficulties, or bring herself to file a civil action against
the person who had abused her, “until the safe environment of the
hospital and the understanding and confidence provided by being in
law school brought her to the point where she could act on her
experiences.”97 In Wisniewski v. Diocese of Belleville,98 the plaintiff
alleged that the trigger for his discovery of a claim against the diocese
was media reporting in 2002 about the clergy sexual abuse scandal
within the Archdiocese of Boston.99
See, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 92, at 404 (“Legislation that eliminates the civil SOL or
includes a discovery rule is supported by various studies on the long-term effects of child
molestation and the likely delay in disclosure.”); Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan
Corp., 119 A.3d 462, 514–15 (2015) (“The public policy objective argued by the plaintiff finds
support from numerous commentators.”).
94 See, e.g., Wisniewski v. Diocese of Belleville, 943 N.E.2d 43, 68 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011)
(recounting the expert explanation that children and adults “will keep such things inside until
something pierces their defense mechanisms and overwhelms their psychological need to look
away.”).
95 Palacette v. M.G.S.L., No. 09-09-00410-CV, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 2935, at *1 (Tex. App.
Apr. 22, 2010).
96 Id. at *8.
97 Id. See also Melissa G. Salten, Statutes of Limitations in Civil Incest Suits: Preserving the
Victim’s Remedy, 7 HARV. WOMEN’S L. J. 189, 202 (1984) (“Generally, it is only when the victim
enters therapy that any meaningful understanding of her injuries can be developed.”); id. at
204 (noting “the recency of authoritative evidence regarding belated manifestation of incest
trauma”); Rosemarie Ferrante, The Discovery Rule: Allowing Adult Survivors of Childhood
Sexual Abuse the Opportunity for Redress, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 199, 224 (1995).
98 Wisniewski v. Diocese of Belleville, 943 N.E.2d 43, 43 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011).
99 See id. at 65, 66, 68.
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Some courts accepted the delayed connection argument.100 Other
courts rejected the argument, concluding that a child sexual abuse
claim is a traumatic injury that accrues when it occurs, and that any
delay in discovering psychological or emotional repercussions from
the injury affects only the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s
damages and not the timing of the accrual of the cause of action.101
Several state legislatures amended their statute of limitations for
child sexual abuse claims expressly to provide prospectively for
delayed discovery based on delayed connection of the injury with its

See Russell G. Donaldson, Running of Limitations Against Action for Civil Damages for
Sexual Abuse of Child, 9 A.L.R. 5TH 321, *3 (collecting cases); see, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 701
F. Supp. 1363, 1369–70 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (predicting that the Illinois Supreme Court would apply
the discovery rule to a child incestuous abuse claim where the plaintiff conceded awareness of
the abuse when it occurred but inability, due to psychological and emotional trauma, to
understand that current psychological and physical maladies were caused by the abuse);
Osland v. Osland, 442 N.W.2d 907, 909 (N.D. 1989) (applying the delayed discovery doctrine
where plaintiff alleged that the psychological effects of childhood sexual abuse prevented her
from “fully understand[ing]” her cause of action during the limitations period); Callahan v.
State, 464 N.W.2d 268, 273 (Iowa 1990) (holding a cause of action for child sexual abuse does
not accrue until the plaintiff reasonably should have discovered that the abuse caused the
emotional and physical maladies); Hammer v. Hammer, 418 N.W.2d 23, 26–27 (Wis. Ct. App.
1987) (citing Borello v. U.S. Oil Co., 388 N.W.2d 140, 146 (Wis. 1986)) (applying delayed
discovery doctrine so that a cause of action for child sexual abuse accrues when the plaintiff
reasonably should understand that the alleged incidents were abusive and their resultant
psychological damage).
101 See, e.g., M.H.D. v. Westminster Sch., 172 F.3d 797, 804–05 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting
Bitterman v. Emory Univ., 333 S.E.2d 378, 379 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985)) (applying Georgia law); see
also, Donaldson, supra note 100, at *4 (listing cases); c.f. Rotkiske v. Klemm, 140 S. Ct. 355,
360 (2019) (holding that federal courts cannot use delayed discovery doctrine to delay
commencement of a limitations period in a federal statute when the statute states that the
period commences “[on] the date . . . the violation occurs”); TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19,
37 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring) (describing the delayed discovery doctrine as “bad wine of
recent vintage” by which courts do not interpret a statute but rather alter it).
100
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effect.102 For example, in Tyson v. Tyson,103 the Washington Supreme
Court held that the delayed discovery doctrine did not apply when
the plaintiff contended that she had repressed all memory of the
childhood incest until her memory was revived in therapy.104 Shortly
thereafter, Washington amended its statute of limitations applicable
to child sexual abuse claims expressly to provide for delayed
discovery, superseding the holding in Tyson v. Tyson.105 Similarly, in

See e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.140(a)–(c) (1994) (allowing the plaintiff to bring a suit within
three years after the plaintiff discovered or through reasonable diligence should have
discovered that the act caused the injury); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.1 (Deering 1986)
(allowing the plaintiff to bring suit within three years after the plaintiff discovers or reasonably
should have discovered that the illness or injury occurring after the age of majority was caused
by the sexual abuse); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-523(a) (1992) (allowing a plaintiff to bring suit
within three years after the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that the
injury or illness was caused by childhood sexual abuse); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 260, §
4C (West 1993) (allowing a plaintiff to bring suit within three years after the victim discovered
or reasonably should have discovered that an emotional or psychological injury was caused by
the sexual abuse); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.073(a) (West 1996) (allowing a plaintiff to bring suit
within six years after the plaintiff knew or had reason to know that the injury was caused by
the sexual abuse); MO. REV. STAT. § 537.046(2) (1996) (allowing a plaintiff to bring suit within
three years after the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that the injury or
illness was caused by child sexual abuse); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-2-216(1)(b) (1995) (allowing
a plaintiff to bring suit within three years after the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should
have discovered that the injury was caused by the act of childhood sexual abuse); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 11.215(1)(a)–(b) (1995) (allowing a plaintiff to bring suit within ten years after the
plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that the injury was caused by sexual
abuse); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:61B-1 (West 1995) (allowing a plaintiff to bring suit within two
years after the reasonable discovery of the injury and its causal relationship to the act of sexual
abuse); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 95(6) (1996) (allowing a plaintiff to bring suit within two years
after the victim discovered or reasonably should have discovered that the injury was caused by
the sexual abuse); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-51(a)(1)(ii) (1995) (allowing a plaintiff to bring a suit
within seven years after the victim discovered or reasonably should have discovered that the
injury was caused by the sexual abuse); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-10-25 (1992) (allowing a
plaintiff to bring suit within three years of the time the victim discovered or reasonably should
have discovered that the injury was caused by sexual abuse); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 522(2019
Subsec. (a)) (1994) (allowing a plaintiff to bring suit within six years of the time the victim
discovered that the injury was caused by the act); WASH. REV. CODE § 4.16.340(1)(a)–(c) (1988)
(allowing a plaintiff to bring suit within three years of the time the victim discovered or
reasonably should have discovered that the injury or condition was caused by the act). See
generally, Theodore R.A. Ovrom, Note, Reasonable for Whom? Developing a More Sensible
Approach to the Discovery Rule in Civil Actions Based on Childhood Sexual Abuse,103 IOWA L.
REV. 1843, 1845 (2018).
103 Tyson v. Tyson, 727 P.2d 226, 226 (Wash. 1986), superseded by statute, WASH. REV. CODE §
4.16.340 (West 1988).
104 Tyson, 727 P.2d at 229–30. See also Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 533 N.W.2d 780,
785–86 (Wis. 1995) (holding that evidence of repressed memory of the incident does not justify
delayed accrual); Lindabury v. Lindabury, 552 So. 2d 1117, 1118 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)
(same); Lemmerman v. Fealk, 534 N.W.2d 695, 702, 703, 704 (Mich. 1995) (same); Doe v.
Maskell, 679 A.2d 1087, 1092 (Md. 1996) (same); Pearce v. Salvation Army, 674 A.2d 1123,
1125, 1126 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (same).
105 See WASH. REV. CODE A NN. § 4.16.340(1)(a)–(c) (West 1988).
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Derose v. Carswell,106 a California court declined to apply the delayed
discovery doctrine to a child sexual abuse claim.107 California later
amended its limitation statute to provide that a claim for child sexual
abuse is time-barred three years after “the plaintiff discovers or
reasonably should have discovered that psychological injury or illness
occurring after the age of majority was caused by the sexual
assault.”108
V. NEW YORK LIMITATIONS LAW BEFORE ENACTMENT OF THE
NYCVA
Before the enactment of the NYCVA in 2019, the limitations period
for claims for damages for negligence under New York law was three
years after the cause of action accrues.109 If the plaintiff was a minor
when the injury occurred, the limitations period commences three
years after the person turns eighteen and no later than ten years
after the cause of action accrues.110
New York courts were not receptive to arguments by child sexual
abuse advocates to overcome the statute of limitations bar by judicial
opinion applying the delayed discovery doctrine to child sex abuse
claims. A New York statute expressly precludes courts from
“extend[ing] the time limited by law for the commencement of an
action.”111 Accordingly, New York courts decline to delay accrual of a
cause of action except where the Legislature has expressly provided
for it.112
Derose v. Carswell, 242 Cal. Rptr. 368, 368 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
See id. at 372.
108 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.1(a) (West 1986) (effective Jan. 1, 2020).
109 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5) (Consol. 1996). The limitations period for a tort action against a
priest perpetrator of sexual abuse, an intentional tort, is one year. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 215(3)
(Consol. 2019); see, also, Tserotas v. Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of N. and S. Am., 673 N.Y.S.2d
1011, 1012 (App. Div. 1998); Sharon B. v. Reverend S., 665 N.Y.S.2d 139, 140 (App. Div. 1997)
(citing Joshua S. v. Casey, 615 N.Y.S.2d 200, 200 (App. Div. 1994); Doe v. Roe, 596 N.Y.S.2d
620, 621 (App. Div. 1993); Mazzaferro v. Albany Motel Enters., 515 N.Y.S.2d 631, 632 (App.
Div. 1987)); Langford v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 705 N.Y.S.2d 661, 662 (App. Div.
2000). See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 899, cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
110 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 208(a) (McKinney 2019).
111 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 201 (McKinney 2020) (“An action . . . must be commenced within the time
specified in this article unless a different time is prescribed by law or a shorter time is
prescribed by written agreement. No court shall extend the time limited by law for the
commencement of an action.”).
112 See id.; see, e.g., Gerschel v. Christensen, 40 N.Y.S.3d 41, 43 (App. Div. 2016); Blanco v.
AT&T, 689 N.E.2d 506, 512, 513 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1997) (stating that New York courts cannot
delay accrual of a cause of action to account for delayed discovery, even to avoid injustice);
Fritzhand v. Discover Fin. Servs., 800 N.Y.S.2d 316, 319 (Sup. Ct. 2005) (first quoting Evans v.
Visual Tech., 953 F. Supp. 453, 456 (N.D.N.Y. 1997); then quoting Playford v. Phelps Mem’l
106
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A. Delayed Discovery
Other than tolling during a person’s minority,113 the New York
Legislature has expressly provided for delayed discovery of a claim in
several situations. For example, the limitations period is delayed
until discovery of the malpractice in cases involving “foreign objects”
left in a patient during surgery,114 exposure to Agent Orange during
Vietnam War era military service,115 exposure to toxic substances,116
and certain actions for fraud against a fiduciary or for
misrepresentation by an agent as to his authority.117 In 1986, New
York amended the general tort statute of limitations to recognize
delayed discovery of latent injury in cases asserting claims for illness
from exposure to toxic substances.118 For so-called “toxic tort” claims,
the limitations period begins “from the date of discovery of the injury
by the plaintiff or from the date when through the exercise of
reasonable diligence such injury should have been discovered by the
plaintiff, whichever is earlier.”119
In Bassile v. Covenant House,120 the New York Supreme Court
declined to apply the delayed discovery doctrine by analogy to delay
running of the limitations period for plaintiff’s claim against a
Catholic religious order for negligence in connection with alleged
sexual abuse by a friar of a fourteen-year-old at a group home

Hosp. Ctr., 680 N.Y.S.2d 267, 268 (App. Div. 1998)) (holding that limitations period for
negligence other than for latent injury due to exposure to toxic substances begins to run when
the injury first occurs even though the injured party may be ignorant of the existence of the
wrong or injury); Playford v. Phelps Mem. Hosp. Ctr., 680 N.Y.S.2d 267, 268 (App. Div. 1998)
(reasoning that, until the legislature provides otherwise, the limitations period on a negligence
claim begins to run when the injury occurs, not on the date when the plaintiff discovers the
injury).
113 See supra note 101.
114 See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Manhattan Med. Grp., P.C., 567 N.E.2d 235, 236 (N.Y. 1990).
115 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214-b (McKinney 2019).
116 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214-c (McKinney 2019); e.g., Wetherill v. Eli Lilly & Co. (In re N.Y. Cty.
DES Litig.), 678 N.E.2d 474, 476–77 (N.Y. 1997); Blanco v. AT&T, 689 N.E.2d 506, 509 (N.Y.
1997) (noting that the legislative history describes the amendment as a “toxic torts” bill).
117 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 206(2)(b) (McKinney 1966).
118 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214-c(2)(3) (McKinney 1966). C.P.L.R. § 214-c applied to a claim to
recover damages for personal injury caused by exposure to a toxic substance. Id. New York
had previously amended C.P.L.R. § 214 to delay the running of limitations period for claims for
personal injury based on exposure to agent orange. NY C.P.L.R. § 214-b (McKinney 1966); see
Consorti v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 657 N.E.2d 1301, 1303 (N.Y. 1995) (holding that
the plaintiff-wife did not have a loss of consortium claim where her husband was exposed to
the injury-causing toxin before their marriage began).
119 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214-c (McKinney 2019).
120 Bassile v. Covenant House, 575 N.Y.S.2d 233, 233 (Sup. Ct. 1991).
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operated by the order.121 The plaintiff alleged that the sexual abuse
caused psychological and emotional injury, resulting in his inability
to perceive “the existence or nature of his psychological and
emotional injuries and their connection to the sexual exploitation”
until seventeen years later, when he was thirty-one years old.122
The court noted that New York courts are “not empowered to
extend the statutory periods out of sympathy for a plaintiff or regret
at a possible claim raised too late.”123 The court held that under New
York law, unless the Legislature has provided otherwise, a tort action
for damages based on child sexual abuse accrues, and the limitations
period begins to run, when the injury occurs, even though the
plaintiff has not yet discovered that he has been injured, and even if
the plaintiff has not yet connected the injury with its negative
emotional and psychological consequences.124
B. Cover-Up and Equitable Estoppel for Breach of a Fiduciary’s
Duty to Disclose
After the Boston Globe coverage of the cover-up of clergy sexual
abuse within the Archdiocese of Boston, sexual abuse of children by
Catholic priests changed from a perpetrator-centered, local problem,
to an institution-centered scandal.125 Advocates for child sexual
abuse claimants described Catholic bishops as “motivated by image
and self-preservation,” who abused their power in “calculated
ignorance of the clear risks to children” by deciding to protect “the
abusers within the institution rather than the children.”126
See id. at 234, 235, 238.
Id. at 234–35.
123 Id. at 235.
124 See id. (citing Schmidt v. Merch. Despatch Transp. Co., 200 N.E. 824, 827 (N.Y. 1936)); see
also Zumpano v. Quinn, 849 N.E.2d 926, 930, 931 (N.Y. 2006); Doe v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati,
849 N.E.2d 268, 275–76 (Ohio 2006) (quoting Norgard v. Brush Wellman, 766 N.E.2d 977, 981
(Ohio 2002) (holding that a cause of action against a diocese accrues as a matter of law when
plaintiff knows that he is assaulted by a priest and the priest is an employee of the diocese);
Doe v. Catholic Bishop for the Diocese of Memphis, 306 S.W.3d 712, 726, 731 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2008) (holding that defendant’s alleged fraudulent concealment could not toll the limitations
period as a matter of law and discussing cases in other jurisdictions).
125 See, e.g., Ellen M. Bublick, Who is Responsible for Child Sexual Abuse? A View from the
Penn State Scandal, 17 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 297, 310 (2014) (arguing that accountability
of third-party facilitators of child sexual abuse is essential to prevent it); Marci A. Hamilton,
Child Sex Abuse in Institutional Settings: What is Next, 89 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 421, 424–25
(2012) (noting various institutions accused of covering up knowledge of child sexual abuse by
employees to protect institutional reputation and discussing the shift in public attention toward
institutional culpability for child sexual abuse and away from cases of individual abuse within
families or among acquaintances).
126 Hamilton et al., supra note 5, at 5.
121
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Advocates asserted that the defendant’s conduct in covering up
decades old abuse was fraud and a theory of liability separate from
negligent supervision. Recall that to plead a claim for negligence
against an employer based on injury caused by an employee’s
intentional sexual assault, the plaintiff must allege that the
employer’s negligence in supervising or retaining the employee was
a proximate cause of the assault and the injuries it caused. 127 An
employer’s liability for negligent supervision of an employee depends
on proof that the employer was on notice, before the assault occurred,
of the employee’s propensity for the type of assault that injured the
plaintiff.128 In Mars v. Diocese of Rochester,129 the court held that to
sustain a claim for fraud against the diocese based on its alleged
cover up separate from a negligent supervision claim, the fraud must
“occur separately from and subsequent to the abuse, and then only
where the fraud claim gives rise to damages separate and distinct
from those flowing from the abuse.”130
Advocates for child sexual abuse claimants also tried to use
Catholic dioceses’ cover up as a means of justifying plaintiffs’ failure
to sue within the limitations period following the alleged abuse.
Advocates argued that a diocese’s fraudulent concealment of its
knowledge of abusive priests, coupled with its position of trust and
authority, prevented the plaintiff from discovering that the diocese
could be a secondary proximate cause of his injury, and thus provided
grounds for equitable estoppel of the diocese’s limitations defense.131
In general, a court can equitably estop a defendant from asserting
a limitations defense “where it is the defendant’s affirmative
See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
129 Mars v. Diocese of Rochester, 763 N.Y.S.2d 885, 885 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003).
130 Id. at 889 (citing Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Doe v. Roe, 596
N.Y.S.2d 620, 620–21 (App. Div. 1993); Coopersmith v. Gold, 568 N.Y.S.2d 250, 252 (App. Div.
1991)); see also Doe, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 620–21 (citing Paver & Wildfoerster v. Catholic High Sch.
Ass’n, 345 N.E.2d 565, 568 (N.Y. 1976); New York Seven-Up Bottling Co. v. Dow Chem. Co.,
466 N.Y.S.2d 478, 480 (App. Div. 1983)) (holding that plaintiff did not sufficiently plead a cause
of action for fraud against the alleged perpetrator of sexual abuse distinct from the intentional
tort claim, even if the defendant’s alleged fraud facilitated his access to plaintiff and concealed
the assault from third parties).
131 See, e.g., Meehan v. Archdiocese of Philadelphia, 870 A.2d 912, 918 (Super. Ct. 2005)
(explaining that child sex abuse plaintiffs alleged that the archdiocese’s cover up of its
knowledge of clergy sexual abuse reasonably prevented their discovery of that the diocese’s
negligence was a proximate cause of their injuries); Cevenini v. Archbishop of Washington, 707
A.2d 768, 771 (D.C. 1998) (explaining that plaintiffs alleged that due to the archdiocese’s
fraudulent concealment, they could not reasonably have known of its negligence until the
archdiocese disclosed its knowledge of an abusive priest’s propensity before assigning him to
plaintiffs’ parish).
127
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wrongdoing . . . which produced the long delay between the accrual of
the cause of action and the institution of the legal proceeding.”132
Equitable estoppel of a limitations defense is not appropriate,
however, where, notwithstanding the defendant’s fraud, the plaintiff
had “‘knowledge’ sufficient to place him . . . under a duty to make
inquiry and ascertain all the relevant facts” pertaining to the claim
before the limitation period expires.133 When the doctrine applies, it
tolls the limitations period only while the defendant’s
misrepresentation prevents the plaintiff from filing suit.134
Courts recognize the doctrine of equitable estoppel to toll the
statute of limitations where the defendant’s fraudulent
misrepresentation or deceitful conduct, upon which the plaintiff
reasonably relied, caused the plaintiff to delay beyond the limitations
period to assert his claim.135 The premise for estoppel to assert a
limitations defense is that a defendant should not benefit from his
own wrongdoing.136 Put another way, tolling the commencement of
the limitations period while the defendant fraudulently concealed
key information from the plaintiff that would obstruct a reasonable
plaintiff’s discovery of her claim recognizes that while the defendant’s
fraudulent concealment scheme is working, the defendant, not the
plaintiff, is the cheaper bearer of time risk.
Outside of New York, courts reached different conclusions on
whether a Catholic organization’s cover up of its knowledge of
abusive employees justified equitable estoppel of its limitations
defense. For example, in Meehan v. Archdiocese of Philadelphia,137
the court held that the plaintiffs’ argument regarding fraudulent
concealment “missed the mark.”138 The court reasoned that once a
Gen. Stencils v. Chiappa, 219 N.E.2d 169, 171 (N.Y. 1966) (citing Feinberg v. Allen, 128
N.Y.S. 906, 907 (App. Div. 1911); Safrin v. Friedman, 96 N.Y.S.2d 627, 631 (Sup. Ct. 1950)).
133 Gleason v. Spota, 599 N.Y.S.2d 297, 298 (App. Div. 1993) (citing McIvor v. Di Benedetto,
503 N.Y.S.2d 836, 837 (App. Div. 1986); Ramsay v. Mary Imogene Bassett Hosp., 495 N.Y.S.2d
282, 285 (App. Div. 1985); Augstein v. Levey, 162 N.Y.S.2d 269, 273 (App. Div. 1957)).
134 See Doe v. Holy See, 793 N.Y.S.2d 565, 569 (App. Div. 2005) (citing Golden v. Scalise, 451
N.Y.S.2d 215, 216 (App. Div. 1982)).
135 See Zumpano v. Quinn, 849 N.E.2d 926, 929 (N.Y. 2006) (citing Simcuski v. Saeli, 377
N.E.2d 713, 716 (N.Y. 1978)) (holding that equitable estoppel did not apply to bar defendant
from asserting limitations defense in a child sex abuse case); Gen. Stencils, 219 N.E.2d at 171
(noting that New York courts have exercised discretion to apply equitable estoppel to the bar
of a statute of limitations); see, e.g., Simcuski, 377 N.E.2d at 716 (tolling the statute of
limitations by equitable estoppel in a medical malpractice claim based on the doctor’s
intentional concealment of malpractice).
136 E.g., Gen. Stencils, 219 N.E.2d at 170 (“[t]he principle that a wrongdoer should not be able
to take refuge behind the shield of his own wrong is a truism.”).
137 Meehan, 870 A.2d 912.
138 Id. at 922 (quoting Kelly v. Marcantonio, 187 F.3d 192, 201 (1st Cir. 1999)).
132
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plaintiff became aware of the abuse, he should have known that the
archdiocese, as the abusive priest’s employer, was potentially
liable.139 Similarly, in Doe v. Catholic Bishop for the Diocese of
Memphis,140 the court rejected the plaintiff’s argument, noting that
the plaintiff never sued the priest perpetrator, never sought
discovery regarding the priest’s prior history of sexual abuse and the
diocese’s knowledge of it, and never inquired of the diocese about its
knowledge of the priest’s history.141 For these reasons, the court held
that the plaintiff failed to exercise reasonable diligence, the diocese’s
non-disclosure was irrelevant, and the trial court erred in denying
the diocese’s motion to dismiss on limitations grounds.142 In contrast,
some courts allowed the issue of whether the defendant’s cover up
justified a plaintiff’s failure to sue within the limitations period to go
to the jury.143
Although a New York statute precludes courts from modifying a
limitations period,144 the Court of Appeals has held that courts have
discretion to invalidate a limitations defense on grounds of equitable
estoppel.145 Equitable estoppel to assert a statute of limitations
defense based on the defendant’s fraud requires an affirmative
fraudulent act by the defendant after the injury that is the subject of
the claim.146 An obstacle for child sexual abuse claimants in New
Meehan, 870 A.2d 912 (citing Kelly, 187 F.3d at 201)); see also, Cevenini v. Archbishop of
Wash., 707 A.2d 768, 773 (D.C. 1998) (holding that plaintiffs’ knowledge of the priest’s
misconduct and that he was an employee of the archdiocese put them on notice of claims against
the archdiocese).
140 Doe v. Catholic Bishop for the Diocese of Memphis, 306 S.W.3d 712 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008).
141 Id. at 730.
142 Id. at 730–31.
143 E.g., Wisniewski v. Diocese of Belleville, 943 N.E.2d 43, 79 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (holding that
the jury could find that the plaintiff had no reason to suspect that the diocese knew of the
priest’s history of child abuse and nonetheless assigned him to the plaintiff’s parish until the
national coverage regarding clergy sexual abuse in Boston in 2002); Matthews v. Roman
Catholic Diocese of Pittsburgh, 67 Pa. D. & C. 4th 393, at *407 (Ct. Com. Pl. 2004) ("[a] jury
may find that there is a loud ring of truth to plaintiff’s statement that he and his family never
approached Diocesan officials to ask whether they had knowingly assigned to their church, to
work directly with the parishioners, including young boys, a priest with a history of sexually
molesting children, because it would never cross their minds that the church would do so");
Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 196 F.3d 409, 432 (2d Cir. 1999)
(affirming trial court’s denial of diocese’s motion to dismiss on limitations grounds because the
effect of the diocese’s concealment on the plaintiff’s diligence in prosecuting his claim was an
issue of fact for the jury).
144 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 201 (McKinney 2020); see discussion supra Part V, subheading 1.
145 See Gen. Stencils, 219 N.E.2d 169, 170 (noting that the doctrine of equitable estoppel of a
limitations defense is “[d]eeply rooted in our jurisprudence”).
146 See Zumpano v. Quinn, 849 N.E.2d 926, 929 (N.Y. 2006) (holding that plaintiff must show
that defendant’s “subsequent and specific actions” prevented the plaintiff from asserting his
claim within the limitations period) (citing Matter of Steyer, 521 N.E.2d 429, 423 (N.Y. 1988)).
139
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York was that the dioceses’ cover up was at most non-disclosure or
concealment, and not an affirmative false representation about the
state of its knowledge on which the plaintiff could justifiably rely. 147
New York courts recognize an exception to the “subsequent
affirmative fraudulent act” requirement in cases of non-disclosure or
active concealment of information, where the defendant is a fiduciary
to the plaintiff and under a duty to disclose. 148 Failure by a fiduciary
to discharge that affirmative duty to disclose is grounds for
estoppel.149
A fiduciary relationship exists where one party
justifiably reposes confidence in the other (the fiduciary) and
reasonably relies on the fiduciary’s superior expertise or
knowledge.150 When a fiduciary conceals facts he has a duty to
disclose and the plaintiff relies on that non-disclosure in a decision to
abandon diligent investigation of her claim, the fiduciary is estopped
from asserting a limitations defense, although it did not actively
defraud the plaintiff by misrepresentation.151
In 2006, in Zumpano v. Quinn,152 the New York Court of Appeals
rejected the argument that the Diocese of Brooklyn’s cover up was
grounds for estoppel of the diocese’s statute of limitations defense.153
The plaintiff did not allege that the diocese made any specific
misrepresentation to the plaintiff, or any “separate and subsequent
acts of wrongdoing beyond the sexually abusive acts
themselves. . . .”154 Because the plaintiff was aware of the abuse and
was aware that the priest abuser was a diocesan employee, when the
abuse occurred, the diocese’s subsequent cover up was causally
See id. at 930.
E.g., Horn v. Politopoulos, 628 Fed. App’x 33, 34 (2d Cir. 2015) (“[t]o merit equitable
estoppel, a plaintiff must allege either active fraudulent concealment or a fiduciary relationship
giving rise to the defendant’s obligation to inform the plaintiff of the facts underlying the
claim.”) (citing Doe v. Holy See (State of Vatican City), 793 N.Y.S.2d 565, 568 (N.Y. 2005)).
149 See Zumpano, 849 N.E.2d at 930 (“[w]here concealment without actual misrepresentation
is claimed to have prevented a plaintiff from commencing a timely action, the plaintiff must
demonstrate a fiduciary relationship . . . which gave the defendant an obligation to inform him
or her of facts underlying the claim.” (quoting Gleason v. Spota, 599 N.Y.S.2d 297, 298 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1993)).
150 See Holy See, 793 N.Y.S.2d at 568 (quoting WIT Holding Corp. v. Klein, 724 N.Y.S.2d 66,
66 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001)).
151 See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980) (“[T]he duty to disclose arises when
one party has information "that the other [party] is entitled to know because of a fiduciary or
other similar relation of trust and confidence between them.”) (citations omitted).
152 Zumpano v. Quinn, 849 N.E.2d 926, 929 (N.Y. 2006). Plaintiff alleged that the diocese knew
of clergy sexual abuse of children for over 40 years and failed to report the abuse to police,
reassigned known priest abusers without disclosing the abuse, and settled victims’ complaints
about abuse subject to non-disclosure agreements. Id. at 929–30.
153 Id. at 927.
154 Id. at 930.
147
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unrelated to the plaintiff’s failure to sue the diocese within the
limitations period.155 The court declined to decide whether a Catholic
diocese was a fiduciary to members of the faithful in a parish within
the diocese.156 The court noted that even if it found that the diocese
was a fiduciary to the plaintiff, the plaintiff failed to allege how the
diocese’s failure to disclose its wrongdoing prevented the plaintiff
from suing within the limitations period.157 Nothing the diocese
might have done or failed to do after the incidents of sexual abuse
affected the plaintiff’s knowledge at the time of the abuse of his injury
and its cause.158
Three years later, in Doe v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Rochester,159
the Court of Appeals considered whether a Catholic priest had a
fiduciary duty to an adult congregant who alleged that the priest
sexually abused her within a counselling relationship. 160 The court
held that to show a fiduciary duty, the congregant must “set forth
facts and circumstances in the complaint demonstrating that the
congregant became uniquely vulnerable and incapable of selfprotection regarding the matter at issue.” 161 The court concluded
that the plaintiff’s allegations did not meet the standard.162
New York courts have held that to establish a diocese’s fiduciary
duty to a sex abuse claimant, the plaintiff “may not merely rely on
the church’s status in general” but must show that his relationship
with the diocese was unique from the diocese’s ordinary relationship
with other parishioners so as to justify the plaintiff’s confidence in
and reasonable reliance on the diocese’s superior expertise or

Id. at 929.
See id. at 930–31.
157 Id. at 928.
158 Id. at 930. “Plaintiffs possessed timely knowledge of the actual misconduct and the
relationship between the priests and their respective dioceses to make inquiry and ascertain
relevant facts prior to the running of the statute of limitations.” Id.; see also Baselice v.
Fransciscan Friars Assumption BVM Province, Inc., 879 A.2d 270, 278–79 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005)
(holding that fraudulent concealment as grounds for estoppel did not apply in sex abuse claim
because diocese did not cause plaintiff’s failure to sue within the limitations period); Doe v.
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Archdiocese of Detroit, 692 N.W. 2d 398, 405 (Mich. Ct. App.
2004) (same); Mark K. V. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 73, 78–
79 (1998) (same); Doe v. Archdiocese of Washington, 689 A.2d 634, 644 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1977) (same).
159 907 N.E.2d 683 (N.Y. 2009).
160 Id. at 683.
161 Id. at 683–84 (citing Marmelstein v Kehillat New Hempstead: Rav Aron Jofen Community
Synagogue, 892 NE2d 375 (2008)).
162 Roman Cath. Diocese of Rochester, 907 N.E.2d at 684.
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knowledge as to his affairs.163 Allegations that the diocese provided
pastoral services and held out parish schools as religious education
institutions with programs for children were insufficient to establish
the requisite fiduciary relationship.164 New York courts have noted
and declined to follow decisions in other jurisdictions that recognized
a fiduciary relationship between a diocese and a plaintiff parishioner
based on allegations that the plaintiff attended a parish Catholic
school, participated in parish-sponsored activities or was the object
of the priest perpetrator’s individual attention.165
New York courts have also rejected an alternative argument for
estoppel based on “religious duress.” For example, in Doe v. Holy
See,166 plaintiffs sued the Diocese of Syracuse, various parishes
within the diocese, and the Holy See for child sexual abuse committed
by diocesan priests.167 In response to the defendants’ limitations
defense, the plaintiffs unsuccessfully alleged equitable estoppel
based on fraudulent concealment.168
The plaintiffs argued
alternatively that, due to the hierarchical structure and required
obedience to ecclesiastical authority under Catholic canon law, they
were afraid to sue the diocese, and that their fear justified their
failure to sue within the limitations period. 169 The court held that
factual inquiry into the plaintiffs’ claim of religious duress would
entangle the courts in a religious matter.170 In any event, the
Doe v. Holy See, 793 N.Y.S.2d 565, 568 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (citing Doe v. Norwich R.C.
Diocesan Corp., 268 F. Supp. 2d 139, 149–50 (D. Conn 2003)); Hoatson v. New York
Archdiocese, 901 N.Y.S.2d 907, 907 (Sup. Ct. 2009) (citing Doe, 793 N.Y.S.2d at 568).
164 Holy See, 793 N.Y.S.2d at 568–69. But see, id. at 570–71 (Peters, J., dissenting) (arguing
for a fiduciary relationship with the diocese based on allegations that plaintiffs attended a
Catholic parish school, were singled out for individualized instruction or special attention, and
their families permitted them to participate in church-sponsored extra-curricular activities).
165 See Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 196 F.3d 409, 430 (2d Cir.
1999) (holding that plaintiff showed a fiduciary relationship based in part on allegations that
the diocese knew of and ignored reports of sexual abuse by the priest); Doe v. Roman Catholic
Diocesan Corp., 309 F. Supp. 2d 247, 252–53 (D. Conn. 2004) (finding a fiduciary relationship
based on allegations that plaintiff participated in parish-sponsored activities, sang in the
parish choir with the abuser’s encouragement, ate dinner with the abuser, and consulted with
the abuser for spiritual counseling with the diocese’s encouragement); Moses v. Diocese of
Colorado, 863 P.2d 310, 321 n.13 (Colo. 1993) (finding a fiduciary duty where the diocese
“occupied a position of superiority, assumed a duty to act in good faith, and then breached their
duty”).
166 793 N.Y.S.2d at 569–70 (discussing religious duress).
167 Id. at 567.
168 Id. at 569.
169 Id. at 569–70 (alleging duress arising from “the beliefs of the Roman Catholic Church and
in the nature of a fear of excommunication or eternal damnation resulting from the pursuit of
a civil action against church officials.”).
170 Id. at 569. See generally Teadt v. St. John’s Evangelical Church, 603 N.W.2d 816, 823
(Mich. Ct. App. 1999) (refusing to recognize a fiduciary relationship between an adult and her
163
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plaintiff failed to allege facts to explain how any such duress
continued after they reached the age of majority or separated from
the Catholic church.171
VI. THE NEW YORK CHILD VICTIMS ACT
In 2019, the New York legislature enacted law that provided both
prospective and retrospective relief from the time bar under prior
limitations laws.
A. Prospective Extension of the Limitations Period
The NYCVA extended the limitations period prospectively for
criminal charges for certain sexual offenses against a child victim
(the covered sexual offenses) until the victim turns 23 years old.172
As to civil claims, the NYCVA provided two types of prospective
limitations relief. First, the NYCVA extended the limitations period
for certain civil claims until the plaintiff turns 55, and second, the
NYCVA relieved the plaintiff from the burden of complying with
notice of claim requirements against public organization
defendants.173
The NYCVA defines the set of civil claims entitled to prospective
limitations relief by reference to two factors: 1) the type of injury the
plaintiff alleges (the covered claims); and 2) the defendants whose
limitations or notice defenses are prospectively altered (the covered
defendants).174 The covered claims are “civil claims or causes of
action brought by any person for physical, psychological or other

minister because allegations of an imbalance of power or the existence of a special relationship
of trust or confidence would require judicial entanglement in religious doctrine); H.R.B. v.
J.L.G., 913 S.W.3d 92, 98 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (refusing to recognize a claim for breach of
fiduciary duty against a church for clergy sexual abuse because defining the scope of the duty
of clergy to congregants would require excessive entanglement); Langford v. Roman Catholic
Diocese of Brooklyn, 705 N.Y.S.2d 661, 662 (App. Div. 2000) (showing a court’s concern
regarding becoming entangled in a religious matter); Ira C. Lupu v. Robert W. Tuttle, Sexual
Misconduct and Ecclesiastical Immunity, 2004 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1789, 1827–28 (arguing that
judicial determination of whether a fiduciary relationship existed between a clergy member
and a congregant requires impermissible entanglement).
171 Holy See, 793 N.Y.S.2d at 568.
172 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 30.10 (McKinney 2019). The affected sexual offenses are: i) offenses
listed in New York Penal Law § 130, excluding the offense listed in § 30.10(3)(f) committed
against a child less than 18 years old, incest in the first, second or third degree as defined in
Penal Law § 255.25-27, if committed against a child less than 18 years old; ii) and use of a child
in a sexual performance as defined in Penal Law § 263.05 (the covered sexual offenses). Id.
173 S.B. 2440 § 2, § 5-8, 242 Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2019); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 208-b (McKinney 2019).
174 S.B. 2440 § 2, § 5-8, 242 Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2019).
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injury or condition suffered by such person as a result of conduct
which would constitute” a covered sexual offense.175 The covered
defendants are “any party whose intentional or negligent acts or
omissions are alleged to have resulted in the commission of said
conduct.”176
The NYCVA eliminates only limitations and notice of claim
defenses and only for tort claims for personal injury “as a result of”
certain forms of child sexual abuse.177 The NYCVA does not
eliminate any defenses to covered claims other than limitations and,
for public organization defendants, notice of claim. Elimination of
the limitations and notice defenses applies only against the
perpetrator and defendants other than the perpetrator whose
conduct, the plaintiff alleges, “result[s]” in the commission by the
perpetrator of covered offenses.178
The NYCVA does not alter the pleading or proof requirements for
a tort claim based on negligent hiring or supervision against an
employer or other entity responsible for the perpetrator of the
abuse.179 As explained above, the plaintiff must allege and ultimately
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the abuse occurred,
and that the defendant employer knew or should have known of the
abusive propensities of a particular priest abuser before the abuse
occurred.180

Id.
Id.
177 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214-G (McKinney 2019); see Doe v. Diocese of Rockville Centre, No.
900010/2019, 2020 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1964, at *16 (holding that the NYCVA revived all claims
against any defendant “as a result of” certain forms of child sexual abuse, including claims
against an employer other than for its intentional or negligent misconduct, such as recklessness
or gross negligence).
178 S.B. 2440 § 3, 2019-2020 Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2019) (expressly preserving certain defenses to
criminal charges set out in the penal law and “any other defense[s] and affirmative defense
that may be available in accordance with law”).
179 See Doe v. McFarland, No. 34675/2019, 2019, N.Y.L. J. LEXIS 4437, at *3 n.3 (Sup. Ct.
2019) (noting that the NYCVA does not create a new cause of action for tort claims based on
child sexual abuse).
180 See Golden v. Diocese of Buffalo, NY, 125 N.Y.S.3d 813 (App. Div. 2020) (requiring an
allegation that the defendant knew or should have known that the priest was a danger to
children for a claim for damages for negligence under NYCVA); Doe v. Diocese of Rockville Ctr.,
No. 900010/2019, 2020 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1964, at *15–16 (Sup. Ct. May 11, 2020) (holding that
the claims against diocese for negligent hiring, retention, and supervision were properly
pleaded).
175
176
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B. Retroactive Limitations Relief by Revival of Time-Barred Claims
The NYCVA retroactively revives covered claims against covered
defendants, provided that plaintiffs assert the claims within the
designated window of time.181 The NYCVA originally established a
one-year window for filing otherwise time-barred claims free of a
defense based on limitations or notice of claim requirements. 182 The
original window commenced on August 14, 2019 and ended on August
14, 2020.183
On May 8, 2020, Governor Cuomo issued an executive order
extending the window until January 14, 2021 as part of emergency
action to account for the negative impact of COVID-19.184 On May
28, 2020, the New York Legislature passed a bill that extended the
window through August 14, 2021.185 Governor Cuomo signed the bill
and the extension became effective on August 3, 2020.186 The
Sponsor’s Memorandum explained that the window extension would
“provide more time to notify New Yorkers about the [claims revival
window] and allow more survivors to seek the justice that was denied

See S.B. 2440 § 3, 242 Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2019); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214-g (McKinney 2019)
(“Notwithstanding any provision of law which imposes a period of limitation to the contrary
and the provisions of any other law pertaining to the filing of a notice of claim or a notice of
intention to file a claim as a condition precedent to commencement of an action or special
proceeding, every civil claim or cause of action brought against any party alleging intentional
or negligent acts or omissions by a person for physical, psychological, or other injury or
condition suffered as a result of conduct which would constitute a sexual offense [as defined in
the penal code] committed against a child less than eighteen years of age, incest [as defined in
the penal code], or the use of a child in a sexual performance [as defined in the penal code] . . .
which conduct was committed against a child less than eighteen years of age, which is barred
as of the effective date of this section because the applicable period of limitation has expired . .
. is hereby revived . . . .And dismissal of a previous action . . . on grounds that such previous
action was time barred . . . shall not be grounds for dismissal of a revival action pursuant to
this section.”).
182 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214-g (McKinney 2019).
183 Id. Other defenses, however, remain valid, for example, release by settlement, or equitable
laches. See id.
184 Exec. Order No. 202.29 (May 8, 2020), https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/no-20229continuing-temporary-suspension-and-modification-laws-relating-disasteremergency[https://perma.cc/4JYU-P856]; see Amid Ongoing COVID-19 Pandemic, Governor
Cuomo Announces State Will Extend Window for Victims to File Cases under the Child Victims
Act
until
January
14th,
NEW
YORK
STATE
(May
8,
2020),
https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/amid-ongoing-covid-19-pandemic-governor-cuomoannounces-state-will-extend-window-victimsfile#:~:text=Amid%20the%20ongoing%20COVID%2D19,months%20until%20January%2014%
2C%202021[https://perma.cc/CY2H-YU25].
185 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214-g (McKinney 2019).
186 2020 N.Y. Sess. Laws. ch.130 (McKinney).
181
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statute of

C. Legislative History
In 2019 when the bill that would become the NYCVA was pending
in New York, window legislation to revive time-barred claims for
child sexual abused already had a long history elsewhere. In 2002,
California passed the first claims revival legislation, opening a 3-year
window.188 In 2013, Minnesota enacted a claims revival statute,
known as the Minnesota Child Victims Act, which opened a threeyear window for filing time barred child sexual abuse claims.189
For more than a decade before the success in 2019, proponents of
limitations reform for child sexual abuse civil claims in New York
introduced limitations reform bills that passed in the Democraticcontrolled Assembly but failed to win support in the Republicancontrolled Senate.190 The New York State Catholic Conference
(NYSCC) lobbied against these early versions of the NYCVA.191 The
2019 Legis. Bill. His. NY Senate Bill S7082 (N.Y. 2020).
Sen. Bill No. 1779, (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.) § 340.1. See generally CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 340.1(Q) (West 2020) (California has recently enacted legislation opening a second claims
revival window).
189 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.073 (West 2013). Todd Melby, Sex Abuse Victims Say Minn. Law
Brought Hope, Chance for Justice, MPR NEWS (May 25, 2016, 9:00 AM),
https://www.mprnews.org/story/2016/05/25/sex-abuse-victims-say-minnesota-law-broughthope. [https://perma.cc/JZN6-REH3] (over 900 claims were filed within the window).
190 E.g., 2019 Legis. Bill Hist. NY Senate Bill S2440 (N.Y. 2020) (explaining the prior
legislative history as follows: 2018 NY Senate Bill S6575, sponsored by New York State Senator
Brad Hoylman died in Codes; 2017 NY Assembly Bill A5885-A, sponsored by New York State
Assemblymember Linda B.Rosenthal passed Assembly; 2015 NY Senate Bill S63-A, sponsored
by New York State Senator Brad Hoylman died in Codes, which was similar legislation to
NYCVA; 2015 NY Assembly Bill A2872-A, sponsored by New York State Assemblymember
Margaret Markey died in Codes, which was similar legislation to NYCVA; 2015 NY Assembly
Bill A1771-A, sponsored by New York State Assemblymember Margaret Markey died in Codes,
which was similar legislation to the NYCVA; 2012 NY Assembly Bill A10814-B of 2012,
sponsored by New York State Assemblymember Margaret Markey died in Codes, which was
similar legislation to the NYCVA).
191 See, e.g., Marci A. Hamilton, Reforming the Statute of Limitations for Child Sex Abuse: New
York’s Child Victims Act Shouldn’t Be Political, But It Is, FINDLAW (June 10, 2010),
https://supreme.findlaw.com/legal-commentary/reforming-the-statute-of-limitations-for-childsex-abuse-new-yorks-child-victims-act-shouldnt-be-political-but-itis.html[https://perma.cc/9URR-HTSX] (asserting that the most virulent opposition to the bill
was the New York Catholic Conference of Bishop); see Augusta Anthony, New York Passes
Child Victims Act, allowing child sex abuse survivors to sue their abusers, CNN (Jan. 28, 2019,
10:46
PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/28/us/new-york-child-victims-act/index.html
[https://perma.cc/H8S5-DPB9](quoting Cuomo noting opposition of the New York Catholic
Conference); See generally, James O’Reilly & Margaret Chalmers, THE CLERGY SEX ABUSE
CRISIS AND THE LEGAL RESPONSES 66 (2014); Kathleen E. Carey, Bill Extending Statute of
Limitations For Sexual Abuse Fails to Pass PA House, T. HERALD (Oct. 26, 2016),
187
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insurance industry lobbied against the claims revival aspect of the
proposed legislation too.192 Insurers were understandably concerned
about the financial impact of coverage claims on decades-old policies.
In 2019, ratings firm A.M. Best noted that claims revival legislation
in New York and other states posed a significant and growing risk to
insurance companies.193
Many Catholic dioceses in New York and in other states had
implemented voluntary, independently administered claims
mediation and settlement processes called Independent
Reconciliation and Compensation Programs (IRCPs) to provide
compensation and other support to persons who claimed to have been
abused by diocesan clergy.194 IRCPs were modeled after the
September 11th Victim’s Compensation Fund, administered by
lawyer and mediator Kenneth Feinberg.195 In general, under IRCPs,
https://www.timesherald.com/news/bill-extending-statute-of-limitations-for-sexual-abusefails-to-pass-pa-house/article_18b3308b-2caf-5d42-a39d-005b146a84a0.html
[https://perma.cc/3B5Z-7JNU]; George Joseph, US Catholic Church Has Spent Millions
Fighting Clergy Sex Abuse Accountability, THE GUARDIAN (May 12, 2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/may/12/catholic-church-fights-clergy-child-sexabuse-measures[https://perma.cc/BT6U-2F2J] (“The US Catholic Church has poured millions
of dollars over the past decade into opposing accountability measures for survivors of clergy sex
abuse.”); Marisa Kwaiatkowski & John Kelly, The Catholic Church and Boy Scouts are
Lobbying Against Child Abuse Statutes. This is Their Playbook, USA TODAY (updated April 23,
2020),
https://www.usatoday.com/in-depth/news/investigations/2019/10/02/catholic-churchboy-scouts-fight-child-sex-abuse-statutes/2345778001/ [https://perma.cc/BV2B-D8T8]. See also
Mayo Moran, Cardinal Sins: How the Catholic Sexual Abuse Crisis Changed Private Law, 21
GEO. J. GENDER & L. 95, 119–20 (2019) (one commentator opined that the Catholic bishops’
opposition to limitations reform throughout the US may have caused erosion of political support
for existing limitations laws that precluded suits on time-barred claims.).
192 Chris Glorioso & Evean Stulberger, I-Team: Insurance Industry Helped Squash Child Sex
Abuse
Law
in
New
York,
NBC
N.Y.
(Mar.
29,
2018,
12:34
PM),
https://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/child-victims-act-sex-abuse-law-insurance-industrynew-york-albany/456181/ [https://perma.cc/AES9-S6PT] (reporting that the American
Insurance Association spent $130,000 on lobbying in the New York Legislature on various
subjects including the 2018 version of the Child Victims Act).
193 Nicole Friedman, Insurers Face Risk of child Sex-Abuse Claims, WALL ST. J. (July 21, 2019),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/child-sex-abuse-claims-are-a-growing-risk-to-insurance-firms11563710520 [https://perma.cc/8LQK-VDDG] (noting reaction of insurance companies to the
financial impact of increase claims exposure for revived claims under the NYCVA).
194 See John Woods, Archdiocese Opens Independent Reconciliation, Compensation Program for
Victim-Survivors of Clergy Sexual Abuse, CATHOLIC N. Y. (Oct. 6, 2016),
https://www.cny.org/stories/archdiocese-opens-independent-reconciliation-compensationprogram-for-victim-survivors-of-clergy,14547 [https://perma.cc/X2H3-8864] (reporting on
Cardinal Dolan’s remarks on the Archdiocese of New York IRCP program and prior programs
offered by Catholic dioceses).
195 See id.; Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Title IV Victim
Compensation, Pub. L. 107-42, 115 Stat. 230. The Act provides compensation without proof of
negligence for eligible persons in exchange for a release of any right to file or continue a civil
action for damages sustained as a result of the September 11 events. Id. at Title IV,
§ 405(c)(3)(B). See generally Department of Justice, September 11th Victim Compensation
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claims deemed by independent administrators to be meritorious
without regard to any limitations defenses received an offer of
compensation (amount determined by the administrators) in
exchange for a release from liability for the diocese.196
In August 2018, Josh Shapiro, the Pennsylvania Attorney General,
released an investigative grand jury report on the results of a twoyear investigation of child sexual abuse against six Catholic dioceses
in Pennsylvania (the Pennsylvania Report).197 The report recounted
in detail the allegations of hundreds of persons who reported sexual
abuse as children by diocesan clergy, and how dioceses responded to
those allegations.198 The report concluded that the dioceses “brushed
aside” reports of abuse to protect the abusers and the dioceses.199 It
offered recommendations for legislative reform to Pennsylvania’s
limitations laws, including enactment of a claim revival window.200
The Pennsylvania report was the subject of national media

Fund: Compensation of Claims, 83 Fed. Reg. 49,946 (Oct. 3, 2018) (describing the fund and the
role of the Special Master); Kenneth Feinberg, WHAT IS LIVE WORTH?: THE UNPRECEDENTED
EFFORT TO COMPENSATE THE VICTIMS OF 9/11 66 (2005).
196 See
IRCP FAQ, CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF PITTSBURGH, https://diopitt.org/ircp-faq
[https://perma.cc/9RKC-LLMJ]. The Diocese of Pittsburgh explained that compensation was
available under the IRCP for “those who had been harmed, no matter how long ago that
happened.”
197 Office of the Attorney General, Report I of the 40th Statewide Investigating Grand Jury
Redacted, Pa. Att’y Gen. Op.
(2018), https://www.attorneygeneral.gov/report/
[https://perma.cc/DD8X-S259] [hereinafter Pennsylvania Report]. Id. at 1. The Pennsylvania
Report recounted allegations of sexual abuse perpetrated by clergy affiliated with the Dioceses
of Allentown, Erie, Greensburg, Harrisburg, Pittsburgh, Scranton and the Society of St. John.
Id. Allegations against clergy associated with the Dioceses of Altoona-Johnstown and
Philadelphia were not included in the 2018 report because allegations against clergy associated
with those dioceses had been the subject of earlier investigative grand jury reports.
198 See id. at 1, 10.
199 Pennsylvania Report, supra note 197, at 1. But see, Peter Steinfels, The PA Grand-Jury
Report:
Not
What
It
Seems,
COMMW.
MAG.
(Jan.
25,
2019),
https://www.commonwealmagazine.org/pa-grand-jury-report-not-what-it-seems
[https://perma.cc/3K67-U3G8]. Concluding based on a review of material presented in the
Pennsylvania Report and testimony presented to the grand jury that the conclusion that
dioceses routinely and universally covered up reports of clergy sexual abuse of children is
“grossly misleading, irresponsible, inaccurate, and unjust”.
200 See Pennsylvania Report, supra note 197, at 7–8.
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reporting,201 and likely galvanized political support for claims revival
legislation in New York.202
A sticking point for the NYSCC over the 2018 version of the
NYCVA had been the disparate treatment for private organizations
like Catholic dioceses (who would lose the limitations defense for
claims asserted during the revival window) and public organizations
who would remain protected from liability by New York’s notice of
claim rules.203 Under New York law, as a condition precedent to suit,
a plaintiff seeking to sue a public organization for negligence must
submit to the agency a notice of suit within ninety days after the
injury occurred.204 The 2019 legislation eliminated this distinction
by expressly eliminating for public organizations the notice of claim
defense for claims filed within the window.205 The NYSCC withdrew
its opposition to the 2019 bill, ostensibly because the bill treated
private and public defendants equally with respect to liability for
time-barred claims.206

See, e.g., Laurie Goodstein & Sharon Otterman, Catholic Priests Abused 1,000 Children in
Pennsylvania,
Report
Says,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
14,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/14/us/catholic-church-sex-abuse-pennsylvania.html
[https://perma.cc/N9VG-7CTC]; Editorial Board, The Catholic Church’s Unholy Stain, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/13/opinion/pope-catholics-sexualabuse.html [https://perma.cc/VK3S-4NRA] (calling the Pennsylvania Report “gut-wrenching”
and opining that the crisis is “devouring the Roman church”).
202 See Hamilton et al., supra note 5, at 4 (describing limitations reform accomplished in 2019
as the result of three “historic developments” occurring in 2018, release of the 2018
Pennsylvania Report, media video coverage of claimants’ testimony against accused child
abuser Larry Nassar, and print media coverage of alleged child sex-trafficker Jeffrey Epstein);
Sean Carlson, A Grand Jury Investigation into Sex Abuse by New York Clergy Could Fall Short,
WNYC NEWS (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.wnyc.org/story/state-lawmaker-wary-grand-jurywould-bring-justice-sex-abuse-victims/ [https://perma.cc/GN6N-ZAKG] (reporting that NY
State Assembly member Linda Rosenthal said that NY should follow the recommendation in
the Pennsylvania Grand Jury’s report regarding enactment of a claims revival window).
203 See Michael Gartland, Catholic Church Spent $10.6M in Northeast on Lobbying Since 2011,
N.Y. DAILY NEWS (June 4, 2019), https://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/ny-metrocatholic-church-lobbyists-20190604-hgrmn5ip6rh55ksdzrlr4eemzq-story.html
[https://perma.cc/6QZH-VX3K].
204 N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 50-e (McKinney 2019) (amended by NYCVA to exclude claims for
child sexual abuse).
205 See S.B. 2440, 242d Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2019).
206 See NYS Bishops Statement on Passage of Child Victims Act, N.Y. ST. CATHOLIC CONF. (Jan.
28, 2019), https://www.nyscatholic.org/nys-bishops-statement-on-passage-of-child-victims-act/
[https://perma.cc/U8W9-K48G]; N.Y. S.B. 2440 § 2(b); see also E-mail from Susan Phillips
Read, former Assoc. J. of the New York Ct. of Appeals and Of Couns. at Greenberg Traurig,
LLP to Richard Barnes, p. 1, 4 (May 21, 2018) (available at https://www.nyscatholic.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/06/2018-analysis-of-Susan-Read.pdf) [https://perma.cc/QZ3A-X6S9].
201
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As a result of the 2018 election, Democrats controlled both houses
of the New York Legislature.207 Governor Cuomo, a Democrat, made
passage of the NYCVA a part of his agenda for his first 100 days in
office.208 Child advocacy and public interest organizations expressed
their support for the NYCVA.209 On February 14, 2019, Cuomo
signed the NYCVA into law.210 Speaking to adults who experienced
childhood sexual abuse who were present at the signing of the
legislation, Governor Cuomo said, “[t]his is society’s way of saying we
are sorry . . . that it took us so long to acknowledge what happened to
you.”211
The Senate Committee Report for the bill that became the NYCVA
explained that the statute, if enacted, “would open the doors of justice
to the thousands of survivors of child sexual abuse in New York
State . . . help the public identify hidden child predators through civil
litigation discovery, and shift the significant and lasting costs of child
sexual abuse to the responsible parties.”212
The Assembly Committee Report asserted: “The societal plague of
sexual abuse against minors is now well-documented. Also wellestablished is how certain abusers—sometimes aided by institutional

See Vivian Wang, Democrats Take Control of New York Senate for First Time in Decade,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/07/nyregion/democrat-nysenate.html [https://perma.cc/V3FD-YFRM].
208 Governor Cuomo Unveils Agenda for First 100 Days - 2019 Justice Agenda, GOVERNOR
ANDREW M. CUOMO (Dec. 17, 2018), https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomounveils-agenda-first-100-days-2019-justice-agenda [https://perma.cc/AU6F-22WK].
209 See e.g., Jewish Leaders and Rabbis Who Support Child Victims Act (New York), KOL V’OZ,
http://sol-reform.com/News/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/LETTER-Jewish-leaders-and-rabbissupport-NY-Child-Victims-Act-PETITION.pdf [https://perma.cc/SJQ3-5YDJ]. The following
organizations submitted letters of support: Citizens’ Committee for Children of New York, Inc.;
Kol v’Oz; New York State Children’s Alliance, Inc.; New York State Coalition Against Domestic
Violence; New York State Coalition Against Sexual Assault; The New York Society for the
Prevention of Cruelty to Children; Planned Parenthood; Safehorizon; The Sexual Addiction
Treatment and Training Institute; YWCA Brooklyn; Za’akah; and Legislature of Erie County,
New York. See N.Y. S.B. 2440.
210 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214-g (McKinney 2019); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 30.10-3(f) (McKinney
2019); N.Y. S.B. 2440. See also Augusta Anthony, New York Passes Child Victims Act, Allowing
Child Sex Abuse Survivors to Sue Their Abusers, CNN (Jan. 28, 2019),
https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/28/us/new-york-child-victims-act/index.html
[https://perma.cc/T9EX-JM5K] (quoting Marci Hamilton as saying that the passage in both
houses “represents over 15 years of work by survivors and advocates trying to get around the
stiff opposition from the Catholic bishops and the insurance industry”).
211 Elizabeth Joseph, ‘This is Society’s Way of Saying We Are Sorry,’ New York Governor Tells
Survivors of Sex Abuse Before Signing Child Victims Act into Law, CNN (Feb. 14, 2019),
https://www.cnn.com/2019/02/14/us/new-york-child-victims-act-signed/index.html
[https://perma.cc/V65N-5ZWS].
212 INTRODUCER’S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT, S. 242-S.B. 2440, 2019 Legis. Sess., at 7–8 (N.Y.
2019).
207
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enablers and facilitators—have been successful in covering up their
heinous acts against children, either by guile, threats, intimidation,
and/or attacks upon child-victims.”213 It notes that the bill “is a
legislative acknowledgement of the unique character of sex crimes
against children, which can have a multitude of effects upon victims,
including being justifiably delayed in otherwise timely taking action
against their abusers and/or those who facilitated in their abuse.”214
Neither the Senate nor Assembly Committee Reports refer to facts or
cite to authoritative sources to support these assertions.
VII. THE LESSONS AND LEGACY OF REVIVAL
Retroactive claims revival legislation effectively shifts to
defendants and the judicial system all risks and costs associated with
adjudication based on time-degraded evidence.
The delayed
discovery doctrine preserves the defendant’s limitations defense
except where the plaintiff can persuade the finder of fact that her
delay in suing is justified under the circumstances in her case. In
contrast, a statutory claim revival window eliminates the defendant’s
limitations defense against any plaintiff who files a covered claim
within the window, without regard to that plaintiff’s justification for
delay.
Claim revival window legislation retroactively upends defendants’
expectations as to the duration of their potential liability for
wrongdoing. It is difficult to assess the impact on defendants, or on
the judicial system, of that undermining of reliance interests.
Defendants’ reliance interest in a limitations defense is hard to value
because limitations defenses are unstable. The legislatures who
create limitations defenses can retract them, even retroactively,
subject only to constitutional limitations.215
The Supreme Court has concluded that the Fourteenth
Amendment does not prohibit states from passing legislation to
revive claims that previous legislation had time-barred.216 Due
process protection against retroactive retraction of limitations
defenses under state constitutions varies.217
The Diocese of
NEW YORK COMM. REP., A. 242-2683, 2019 Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2019).
Id.
215 Consideration of constitutional constraints on retroactive limitations relief like claim
revival windows is beyond the scope of this article.
216 See Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314–15 (1945).
217 See, e.g., Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 119 A.3d 462, 471, 508 (Conn.
2014) (holding that retroactive application of amendments to limitations law to extend the
213
214
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Rockville-Centre challenged the NYCVA under the New York
Constitution. In Werner v. Diocese of Rockville-Centre,218 New York
Supreme Court held that due process required only that the
retroactive legislation remedy “an identifiable injustice,” and that the
legislature’s revival of child sexual abuse claims “was reasonable in
light of that injustice.”219 Applying this standard, the court held that
the claims revival window in the NYCVA passed constitutional
muster.220
The legislative reports accompanying the NYCVA articulate the
“injustice” that motivated the passage of the law.221 They highlight
the arguments advocates advanced before the courts to achieve
limitations relief. They assert as fact that the unique psychological
attributes of child sexual abuse claims coupled with the culpability of
the defendants justifies an exception from the time-bar.222
Although the consensus regarding the moral offense of
organizational negligence in protecting children from sexual abuse is
clear,223 the factual premises that might justify revival of time-barred
claims for this failure are not clear. As to the premise that persons
who experience child sexual abuse are uniquely impaired in their
ability to sue promptly, the New York Assembly Committee Report
noted, without citation to authority, that child sexual abuse is
distinct from other forms of traumatic injury.224 The report noted
that persons who experience criminal sexual abuse as children can
“be[] justifiably delayed” in suing the perpetrator and “those who
facilitated their abuse.”225
limitations period for child sexual abuse claims did not violate substantive due process
protections under the Connecticut Constitution, and surveying the constitutional law of other
states on retroactive limitations relief).
218 Werner v. Diocese of Rockville-Centre, No. 900012/2019, 2020 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2003, at
*11 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 11, 2020).
219 Id. (quoting Sweener v. St.-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., No. 1:17-CV-0532, 2018
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19893, at *21 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2018)).
220 See Werner, 2020 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2003, at *14–15.
221 INTRODUCER’S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT, S. 242-S.B. 2440, 2019 Legis. Sess., at 7–8 (N.Y.
2019); NEW YORK COMM. REP., A. 242-2683, 2019 Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2019).
222 See Elizabeth A. Wilson, Suing for Lost Childhood: Child Sexual Abuse, the Delayed
Discovery Rule, and the Problem of Finding Justice for Adult-Survivors of Child Abuse, 12
UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 145, 194 (2003); NEW YORK COMM. REP., A. 242-2683, 2019 Legis. Sess.
(N.Y. 2019).
223 See
Timothy D.
Lytton, Legal
Legacy, BOS. GLOBE
(Feb. 4, 2007),
http://archive.boston.com/news/globe/ideas/articles/2007/02/04/legal_legacy/
[https://perma.cc/44XH-YYSP] (describing the clergy child sexual abuse story as “especially
scandalous . . . and one that fueled an unusual level of moral outrage”).
224 See NEW YORK COMM. REP., A. 242-2683.
225 See id.
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Clearly, most child sexual abuse claimants have indeed delayed
decades after the abuse to sue. That people delay in suing for
compensation for a particular type of injury does not explain why
people delay. Nor does it establish that the delay in suing under the
circumstances is reasonable given the degradation of evidence and
the reliability of judicial outcomes over time.
Scientific evidence as to the impact of child sexual abuse on
memory and the capacity of persons to understand the connection
between the abuse and the harm it caused is inconclusive. Some
research on childhood trauma and memory has demonstrated
differences regarding autobiographical memory of childhood
experiences between adults with and without child sexual abuse
histories.226 Generalized assertions based on small scale studies of
human subjects about memory or other psychological effects of
childhood sexual abuse are inherently controversial.227 Researchers
do not agree on a common definition of “child sexual abuse.”228
Survey data of adults who claim to have been abused as children on
the reasons for their delay in reporting abuse may be subject to recall
bias.229
Studies show that the emotional and psychological
See generally Christin M. Ogle et al., Autobiographical Memory Specificity in Child Sexual
Abuse Victims, 25 DEV. PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 321 (2013) (observing both memory deficits and
advantages for child sexual abuse victims relative to non-victims).
227 See Helen P. Hailes et al., Long-Term Outcomes of Childhood Sexual Abuse: An Umbrella
Review, 6 THE LANCET PSYCHIATRY 830, 833–34 (2019) (reviewing studies on psychological
effects of child sexual abuse and concluding that of 559 primary studies, only two studies met
high quality standards).
228 See Laura K. Murray et al., Child Sexual Abuse, 2014 CHILD ADOLESCENT P SYCHIATRY
CLIN. N. AM. 321, 321 (noting that researchers use many definitions of “child sexual abuse” and
that differences may lead to different policy implications). The U.S. Center for Disease Control
and Prevention defines “child sexual abuse” as “any completed or attempted (noncompleted)
sexual act, sexual contact with, or exploitation (i.e., noncontact sexual interaction) of a child by
a caregiver.” Id. at 321 (quoting Rebecca T. Leeb et al., Child Maltreatment Surveillance:
Uniform Definitions for Public Health and Recommended Data Elements 14 (2008)),
http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/cm_surveillance-a.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QY2HQ946]). The World Health Organization defines child sexual abuse as:
226

[T]he involvement of a child in sexual activity that he or she does not fully comprehend, is
unable to give informed consent to, or for which the child is not developmentally prepared
and cannot give consent, or that violate the laws or social taboos of society. Child sexual
abuse is evidenced by this activity between a child and an adult . . . who by age or
development is in a relationship of responsibility, trust or power, the activity being
intended to gratify or satisfy the needs of the other person.
WORLD HEALTH ORG., REPORT OF THE CONSULTATION ON CHILD ABUSE PREVENTION (1999),
https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/65900 [https://perma.cc/RGP3-M2DL].
229 See Leeb et al., supra note 228, at 7; Daniel Cukor & Lata M. McGinn, History of Child
Abuse and Severity of Adult Depression: The Mediating Role of Cognitive Schema, 15 J. CHILD
SEXUAL ABUSE 19, 30 (2006).
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ramifications of sexual abuse in childhood vary depending on factors
specific to the abuse and the individual’s circumstances. 230 For
example, some research indicates that males may experience
different, more severe, mental health effects from childhood sexual
abuse than females.231 Children who are older when the abuse occurs
are more likely to disclose the abuse than younger children.232
Research about the psychological and emotional effects on children of
clergy sexual abuse is undeveloped and inconclusive.233
One
pervasive problem in designing studies to pinpoint the reasons why
people delay in disclosing sexual abuse they experienced as children
is the inability to control for the effects of other forms of childhood

See, e.g., JEROME KROLL, PTSD/BORDERLINES IN THERAPY: FINDING THE BALANCE 190
(1993) (noting that a child’s ability to report sexual abuse at the time it occurs depends on
whether the perpetrator has threatened the child); see also Deborah Goldfarb et al., Long-Term
Memory in Adults Exposed to Childhood Violence: Remembering Genital Contact Nearly 20
Years Later, 7 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. SCI. 381, 382, 390 (2019) (data showed differences in rates
of recalling documented sexual event (genital touching) experienced as children based on
gender and age when the event occurred); Denise-Marie Ordway, Why Sexual Assault Survivors
May Not Come Forward for Years, JOURNALIST’S RES., HARV. KENNEDY SCH., SHORENSTEIN
CTR.
ON
MEDIA,
POL.
&
PUB.
POL’Y
(Oct.
5,
2018),
https://journalistsresource.org/studies/government/criminal-justice/sexual-assault-reportwhy-research/ [https://perma.cc/7242-7FHQ] (summarizing several psychological studies, and
concluding that “the answer is complicated” and that research indicates a wide range of possible
reasons why people delay reporting sexual assault and abuse); Beverly Engel, Why Adult
Victims of Childhood Sexual Abuse Don’t Disclose, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY (Mar. 6, 2019),
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/the-compassion-chronicles/201903/why-adultvictims-childhood-sexual-abuse-dont-disclose [https://perma.cc/24S6-76CU] (listing reasons
people delay disclosure of childhood sexual abuse based on the author’s clinical experience as a
family therapist); DELAYED DISCLOSURE: A FACTSHEET BASED ON CUTTING-EDGE R SCH. ON
CHILD
SEX
ABUSE,
CHILD
USA
2
(Mar.
2020),
https://childusa.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/04/Delayed-Disclosure-Factsheet-2020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QHN2V4FT] (“The delay in disclosing child sex abuse happens for a variety of complex and
overlapping reasons”).
231 See Judy Cashmore & Rita Shackel, The Long-Term Effects of Child Sexual Abuse, AUSTL .
INST. FAMILY STUDIES 9–10 (2013), https://aifs.gov.au/cfca/publications/long-term-effects-childsexual-abuse/impact-child-sexual-abuse-mental-health (describing research that shows that
25% of adults who reported exposure to child sexual abuse did not meet any criteria for
psychiatric diagnoses or adjustment difficulties and 40% exhibited no clear symptoms).
232 See Irit Hershkowitz et al., Trends in Children’s Disclosure of Abuse in Israel: A National
Study, 29 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 1203, 1203 (2005) (finding that 74% of 11-14 year old
children disclosed abuse to researchers whereas 50% of 3-6 year old children disclosed);
Thomas D. Lyon et al., Children's Reasoning About Disclosing Adult Transgressions: Effects
of Maltreatment, Child Age, and Adult Identity, 81 CHILD DEV. 1714, 1723 (2010); see
generally Catherine Townsend, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE DISCLOSURE: WHAT PRACTITIONERS
NEED TO KNOW, DARKNESS TO LIGHT 11 (2016), https://www.d2l.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/01/Child-Sexual-Abuse-Disclosure-Statistics-and-Literature-Review.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GX75-ZLR8] (summarizing conclusions of researchers).
233 See Stephen Brady, The Impact of Sexual Abuse on Sexual Identity Formation in Gay Men,
17 J. CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 359, 359 (2008).
230
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abuse and injury.234 In short, the psychological effects of child sexual
abuse are not sufficiently well understood to support a general
justification for delay based on a unique and pervasive causal
connection between the of the abuse and an abused person’s ability,
as an adult, timely to sue those responsible.
Although psychological science does not offer a blanket justification
for delay, it does offer some support for the conclusion that children
who experience sexual abuse likely face obstacles in asserting their
claims because of their immaturity at the time the incidents occur
and the sexual nature of the incidents. 235 For incidents occurring
during the 1960s–1980s—the statistical peak of the occurrence of
reported incidents involving Catholic clergy236—the obstacles for an
adult to bring a tort action in New York within the then applicable
short limitations period were higher compared to today. Relative to
perceptions in the 1960s to 1980s, perception of child sexual abuse
and the rights of children have changed to accord children a much
greater range of agency for their own bodily integrity and wellbeing.237 Certainly, religious organizations responsible for the care
of children have suffered an erosion of public trust, 238 making them
far less formidable potential defendants. It is easy for a potential
plaintiff to find enthusiastic legal representation today among the
organized and highly visible bar specializing in child sexual abuse
claims.239 Although it was no doubt more difficult to sue an
See, e.g., Jonathan Adams et al., Characteristics of Child Physical and Sexual Abuse as
Predictors of Psychopathology, 86 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 166, 168 (2018) (noting that child
abuse victims frequently experience more than one form of victimization and research on the
effect of on type of abuse frequently fails to control of the effects of other types).
235 See Elizabeth Gruenfeld et al., “A Very Steep Climb”: Therapists’ Perspectives on Barriers
to Disclosure of Child Sexual Abuse Experiences for Men, 26 J. CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 731, 732
(2017) (observing that shame associated with sexual abuse inhibits disclosure by males who
experience it as children); A. Munzer et al., Please Tell! Barriers to Disclosing Sexual
Victimization and Subsequent Social Support Perceived by Children and Adolescents, 2014 J.
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1, 13 (noting that shame was most frequently mentioned as the
obstacle for disclosure); P. Schaeffer et al., Children’s Disclosures of Sexual Abuse: Learning
from Direct Inquiry, 35 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 343, 344 (2011).
236 See Rev. D. Paul Sullins, Is Sexual Abuse by Catholic Clergy Related to Homosexuality?,
2017 NAT'L CATHOLIC BIOETHICS Q. 671, 677 (2018).
237 See Ute Haring et al., Reflecting on Childhood and Child Agency in History, 5 PALGRAVE
COMMUN. 1, 6 (2019) (literature review on history of developments in childhood, child abuse,
and child agency).
238 Lydia Saad, U. S. Confidence in Organized Religion at Low Point, GALLUP (July 12, 2012),
https://news.gallup.com/poll/155690/confidence-organized-religion-low-point.aspx
[https://perma.cc/74VD-9ZXB] (noting decline in confidence in religious institutions and in
public schools, banks and television news).
239 Nate Raymond, Lawyer Ads Seeking Catholic Church Abuse Victims Surge, Report Finds,
REUTERS (Oct. 1, 2021) https://www.reuters.com/legal/litigation/lawyer-ads-seeking-catholic234
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organization for damages for child sexual abuse decades ago,
plaintiffs did bring successful claims for child sexual abuse against
Catholic and other organizations as early as the 1980s.240 Jeff
Anderson, a nationally recognized advocate for child sexual abuse
claimants, reportedly filed more than 200 child sexual abuse suits
against religious organizations during the 1980s and 1990s. 241
That plaintiffs faced obstacles to success in suing a religious
organization for compensation for an employee’s sexual abuse
decades ago that are greater than those they face today does not
provide a clear justification for retroactive relief from limitations
laws. Rather, the fact that legal standards and processes, social
perceptions, and scientific knowledge changes over time, tends to
illustrate the utility of limitations laws.242
Change in these
conditions over time raises another concern about retroactive claims
revival. On the one hand, retroactive limitations relief affords a
pathway to compensation for persons who faced barriers to justice in
period one that do not seem justified in period two. On the other
hand, application of legal, social, and scientific norms prevailing in
period two to adjudicate responsibility for harms occurring in period
one seems inherently unjust to the extent that it holds defendants to
a standard of care they could not reasonably have foreseen in period
one.243 Although the temporal mismatch benefits plaintiffs, it is not

church-abuse-victims-surge-report-finds-2021-10-01/
[https://perma.cc/E4FR-2D42]
(describing results of a study by an advertising tracking firm and noting that lawyer
advertising on church-related sex abuse increased 55% to nearly $2 million during July and
August 2021 compared to the previous two months).
240 See Corey Flintoff, Timeline: Priest Abuse Claims Date Back Decades, NPR (Apr. 26, 2010),
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=126160853
[https://perma.cc/RL2A23J5] (listing history of Catholic clergy sexual abuse criminal and civil litigation beginning in
the 1980’s).
241 Jeff
Anderson
(Attorney),
WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jeff_Anderson_(attorney) [https://perma.cc/VJ5H-LUYM].
242 See, e.g., In re African-American Slave Descendants Litig., 471 F.3d 754, 763 (7th Cir. 2006)
(dismissing with prejudice tort claims of legal representatives of enslaved persons against
corporations who allegedly profited from slavery on statute of limitations grounds); Alexander
v. Oklahoma, 382 F.3d 1206, 1219–20 (10th Cir. 2004) (dismissing as time-barred the claims of
alleged victims and descendants of victims for injuries incurred in the Tulsa race riots in the
1920’s). See generally Erik K. Yamamoto, et al., American Reparations Theory and Practice at
the Crossroads, 44 CAL. W. L. REV. 1, 21-27 (2007) (describing civil claims for reparations for
historic wrongs in the early 2000’s and their failure in the courts on limitations and other
grounds).
243 See Andre v. Pomeroy, 320 N.E.2d 853, 858 (N.Y. 1974) (Breitel, J., dissenting) (“What
would be negligence in retrospect is not negligence in prospect”); Glen Feinberg, What is the
Standard of Care for Child Victims Act Cases, 265 N.Y. L.J. 4 (2021) (arguing that under New
York tort law an organization’s negligence in connection with child sexual abuse should be
measured by the standard of care applicable at the time the abuse occurred).
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clear that the benefit to plaintiffs outweighs the cost to defendants
and the legal system.
The problem of change in legal and social norms over time is
ubiquitous throughout human history and affects all human
activity.244 Claims revival legislation that selects one type of claim
for relief from the time-bar on grounds that claimants had a more
difficult time suing within the otherwise applicable limitations period
than they do today does not distinguish that type of claim from a host
of others. Absent a justification for distinguishing revived claims
from those that remain un-revived, revival undermines the reliability
of all limitations laws, with a corresponding loss in the social value
of repose they otherwise provide.
As explained above, shifting the focus from the plaintiffs’
justification for delay in suing to the defendants’ culpability for
covering up knowledge of clergy sexual abuse of children did not
persuade New York courts to relieve child sexual abuse claimants
from the limitations time bar.245 The cover-up narrative has,
however, been important in shaping public support for retroactive
claims revival legislation for child sexual abuse claims. In addition
to the argument in favor of compensatory justice for holders of
otherwise time-barred claims, advocates assert that retroactive
limitations relief achieves retributive justice—by holding
organizations like Catholic dioceses accountable for their failures to
protect children and cover up behavior.246
Although revival of time-barred child sexual abuse claims will
likely add little to the deterrent effect of liability for current abuse
and prospective limitations reform,247 it will accomplish retribution.
See Annie Niemand, Changing Culture by Changing Norms, MEDIUM (Sept. 2, 2020),
https://medium.com/bending-the-arc/changing-culture-by-changing-norms-64b79c77a14b
[https://perma.cc/S9AG-R26X].
245 See supra Part VII.
246 See, e.g., Pennsylvania Report, supra note 197, at 7, 223, 299 (noting that church officials
who protected clergy who abused children remained in office and got promoted, including
Cardinal Donald Wuerl who later became the archbishop of the Archdiocese of Washington,
D.C.). “Until that changes,” the Report noted, “we think it is too early to close the book on the
Catholic Church sex scandal.” Id.; see also Laurie Goodstein & Sharon Otterman, Catholic
Priests Abused 1,000 Children in Pennsylvania, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/14/us/catholic-church-sex-abuse-pennsylvania.html
[https://perma.cc/P8K5-MLRW].
247 In 2002, the USCCB adopted the Charter for the Protection of Young People, which provides
procedures for collecting and responding to allegations of clergy sexual abuse of minors, and for
prevention of abuse. See Charter for the Protection of Young People, U.S. CONF. OF CATH.
BISHOPS 21 (June 2018), https://www.usccb.org/test/upload/Charter-for-the-Protection-ofChildren-and-Young-People-2018-final(1).pdf [https://perma.cc/GP4K-QBHK]. Each year an
independent investigator audits compliance with the Charter. See, e.g., 2019 Annual Report:
244
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Assuming that retribution against organizations whose negligence
was a proximate cause of sexual abuse of a child is morally
compelling, it is not clear that claims of adults who experienced
sexual abuse as children against organizations whose negligence
contributed to their injuries are uniquely compelling. Even if
retribution for child abuse in general is morally compelling, it is not
clear that child sexual abuse presents a distinctively compelling case
for retroactive claims revival compared to claims for other forms of
child abuse. Research indicates that most abused children suffer
multiple forms of abuse; less than 5% of maltreated children suffer
only one type of abuse.248 A study published by the American
Psychological Association concludes that children who experience
emotional abuse and neglect experience similar or worse mental

Findings and Recommendations, U.S. CONF. OF CATH. BISHOPS (June 2020),
https://cdn.ymaws.com/usccb.site-ym.com/resource/group/1560f0d7-fee7-4aff-afd24cf076a24943/resource_toolbox/audit/2019_annual_report_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/R9ULDH3P]. The 2019 audit reported 4,434 allegations of abuse, 37 of which involved persons who
were minors in 2019. Id. at 28. Of these 37, eight allegations (.002% of all incidents reported
in 2019) were substantiated and the accused clergy were removed from ministry. Id. In
contrast with the assertion in the New York State Assembly Report that child sexual abuse is
a “plague on society,” N.Y. Comm. Rep., Assemb. B. 242-2683 (2019), data from multiple sources
indicate that reported incidents of child sexual abuse involving current minors have
dramatically declined. Reported cases of child sexual abuse by year fell more than 60% from
1992-2010. See David Finkelhor & Lisa Jones, Have Sexual Abuse and Physical Abuse Declined
Since
the
1990s?,
CRIMES AGAINST CHILD.
RES.
CTR.
1
(Nov.
2012),
http://www.unh.edu/ccrc/pdf/CV267_Have%20SA%20%20PA%20Decline_FACT%20SHEET_1
1-7-12.pdf [https://perma.cc/5LHD-CJRM] (concluding based on data from various
governmental reports); see also David Finkelhor & Lisa Jones, Why Have Child Maltreatment
and Child Victimization Declined?, 62 J. OF SOC. ISSUES 685, 685–86 (2006) (finding that
incidents of sexual abuse of children began to decline in the early 1990’s, and between 19902004 substantiated reported incidents of child sexual abuse declined by 49%); David Finkelhor
& Lisa M. Jones, Explanations for the Decline in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, U.S. DEPT. OF
JUSTICE,
OFF.
JUV.
JUST.
DELINQ.
PREVENTION
1–3
(Jan.
2004),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/199298.pdf [https://perma.cc/C9GU-QTVE] (evaluating
explanations of the decline using data from various reporting sources); Erica Goode,
Researchers See Decline in Child Sexual Abuse Rate, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2012),
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/29/us/rate-of-child-sexual-abuse-on-the-decline.html
[https://perma.cc/486C-GAK4]. Physicians who treat physically abused children have noted a
decrease in the number of physically abused child patients but an increase in the severity of
their injuries during the Covid-19 pandemic. See Candy Woodall, As Hospitals See More Severe
Child Abuse Injuries During Coronavirus, ‘The Worst is Yet to Come’, USA TODAY (May 13,
2020), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2020/05/13/hospitals-seeing-more-severechild-abuse-injuries-during-coronavirus/3116395001/ [https://perma.cc/D9BT-9D8B].
248 Philip G. Ney et al., The Worst Combinations of Child Abuse and Neglect, 18 CHILD ABUSE
& NEGLECT 705, 706 (1994). Child abuse takes several forms which researchers have
categorized: physical abuse, physical neglect, verbal abuse, emotional abuse, emotional neglect
and sexual abuse. Id. at 707–09 (reporting on 167 children from 7-18 years old).
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health repercussions than children who experience physical or sexual
abuse.249
VIII. CONCLUSION
A legislature considering retroactive relief from limitations laws
for a particular type of claim must balance the social value of
retribution against the costs. The impact of litigation of revived child
sexual abuse claims on the credibility of the litigation system
remains to be seen. We can anticipate, however, a significant impact
on the legal system.
Laws that set limitations periods and laws that retroactively
eliminate them are particularly hard to defend or justify because they
inescapably balance conflicting interests.250 Absent transparent
consideration of the balancing purpose of limitations laws, and the
reasons for altering the balance, they appear, and perhaps are, no
more than an expression of the current relative political influence of
the persons they affect.251

See Joseph Spinazzola et al., Unseen Wounds: The Contribution of Psychological
Maltreatment on Child and Adolescent Mental Health and Risk Outcomes, 6 PSYCHOL. TRAUMA:
THEORY, RES., PRAC., AND POL’Y S18, S18 (2014). The study used a national data set tracking
5,616 children. Id. at S20.
250 See discussion, supra Part III.
251 See Dawson, supra note 42, at 5 (“If the periods of limitation defined by statute were
carefully adjusted to the requirements of particular cases, or if scientific methods could be used
to measure the effect of lapse of time on legal relationships, then time limitations in statutory
form would doubtless possess a greater moral authority.”). Legislatures are well-adapted to
political process and they make decisions based on anecdote and intuition (as opposed to data)
all the time. See e.g., John Martinez, Rational Legislating, 34 STETSON L. REV. 547, 550, 593,
611 (2005) (noting the tendency of legislatures to “misbehave” by enacting legislation based
solely on anecdote and arguing for a statutory or constitutional requirement for “rational
legislating”—that legislatures explain legislation from logical conclusions based on evidence).
Martinez notes that “[t]he overwhelming majority of legislation enacted by states contains no
findings at all, or findings without reference to supporting evidence.” Id. at 593. See generally
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Bottom-Up Versus Top-Down Lawmaking, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 933, 934
(2006) (noting differences between the law-making capacities of courts (bottom up) and
legislatures (top down) and noting that the two processes “commonly produce different answers
to the same legal questions”).
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